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Should lenders diversify, as suggested by the financial intermediation literature, or specialize, as suggested
by the corporate finance literature? I model a financial institution’s (“bank’s”) choice between these two
strategies in a setting where bank failure is costly and loan monitoring adds value. All else equal,
diversification across loan sectors helps most when loans have moderate exposure to sector downturns
(“downside”) and the bank’s monitoring incentives are weak; when loans have low downside, diversification
has little benefit, and when loans have sufficiently high downside, diversification may actually increase the
bank’s chance of failure. Also, it is likely that the bank’s monitoring effectiveness is lower in new sectors;
in this case, diversification lowers average returns on monitored loans, is less likely to improve monitoring
incentives, and is more likely to increase the bank’s chance of failure. Diversified banks may sometimes need
more equity capital than specialized banks, and increased competition can make diversification either more
or less attractive. These results motivate actual institutions’ behavior and performance in a number of cases.
Key implications for regulators are that an institution’s credit risk depends on its monitoring incentives as
much as on its diversification, and that diversification per se is no guarantee of reduced risk of failure.
JEL Classifications: G11, G21, L20
                                             
I would like to thank Allen Berger, John Boyd, Mark Carey, Michael Gordy, Martin Hellwig, Jack Kareken,
Narayana Kocherlakota, Ross Levine, Kay Mitusch, and Raj Singh for helpful comments. I am also grateful
to seminar participants at the Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin (WZB) 1998 Conference on “Banking Competition
and Financial Contracts,” Carnegie Mellon University, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, and the University of Amsterdam. All responsibility for any mistakes is of
course my own. Please address all correspondence to me at Finance Department, University of Minnesota,
321 19
th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455. Phone: (612) 624-0589. Fax: (612) 626-1335. E-mail:
awinton@csom.umn.edu.Don’t Put All Your Eggs in One Basket? Diversification and Specialization in Lending
Abstract
Should lenders diversify, as suggested by the financial intermediation literature, or specialize, as suggested
by the corporate finance literature? I model a financial institution’s (“bank’s”) choice between these two
strategies in a setting where bank failure is costly and loan monitoring adds value. All else equal,
diversification across loan sectors helps most when loans have moderate exposure to sector downturns
(“downside”) and the bank’s monitoring incentives are weak; when loans have low downside, diversification
has little benefit, and when loans have sufficiently high downside, diversification may actually increase the
bank’s chance of failure. Also, it is likely that the bank’s monitoring effectiveness is lower in new sectors;
in this case, diversification lowers average returns on monitored loans, is less likely to improve monitoring
incentives, and is more likely to increase the bank’s chance of failure. Diversified banks may sometimes need
more equity capital than specialized banks, and increased competition can make diversification either more
or less attractive. These results motivate actual institutions’ behavior and performance in a number of cases.
Key implications for regulators are that an institution’s credit risk depends on its monitoring incentives as
much as on its diversification, and that diversification per se is no guarantee of reduced risk of failure.
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It is the part of a wise man...not to venture all his eggs in one basket. 
– Miguel de Cervantes
Put all your eggs in the one basket and – WATCH THAT BASKET.
– Mark Twain
1. Introduction
Should lenders diversify across different geographic regions and industry sectors, or should they
specialize in a few related sectors – that is, should they follow the advice of Cervantes or of Twain? Experts
on financial institutions generally follow Cervantes: they argue that lenders such as banks, finance
companies, and life insurers are typically highly levered, and diversification across sectors reduces their
chance of costly financial distress; also, several models of intermediation suggest that diversification makes
it cheaper for institutions to achieve credibility in their role as screeners or monitors of borrowers (see
Diamond, 1984, Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984, and Boyd and Prescott, 1986). On the other hand, experts
on corporate finance generally follow Twain: they argue that any firm – financial institution or other – should
focus on a single line of business so as to take greatest advantage of management’s expertise and reduce
agency problems, leaving investors to diversify on their own (see Jensen, 1986, Berger and Ofek, 1996,
Servaes, 1996, and Denis et al., 1997).
Cases can be mustered in support of either view. Supporters of diversification can cite Continental
Illinois’ failure in 1984, linked to a large concentration of energy-sector loans, and Bank of New England’s
failure in 1991, linked to a large concentration in New England real estate loans. Supporters of specialization
can cite the credit problems that followed rapid diversification at many institutions during the 1980s,
including Citicorp, Bank of America, Credit Lyonnais, and a number of major Japanese banks. They can also
point to a number of recent cases where focus has produced superior results without excessive risk, including
Comerica, a specialist in middle market and small business lending, and CapitalOne, FirstUSA, and MBNA,
specialists in credit card lending.
1 Since these contrasting cases suggest that neither diversification nor
specialization always dominates, which circumstances favor one strategy or the other?
I consider this question in a simple model of lending. A financial institution (“bank”) issues debt
(later, I allow for costly equity capital) and uses the funds to make loans to one or two different sectors of
the economy. Bank failure is costly; because investors require compensation for such costs, the bank has
incentive to minimize its chance of failure, all else equal. By monitoring loans, the bank is better able to
catch problem loans before matters deteriorate too far, improving loan returns. Since loans to any particular
sector are most likely to be in  trouble when that sector is in a downturn, monitoring helps most when times2 More generally, increased central tendency in loan portfolio returns increases a bank’s failure
probability if the bank’s debt level is sufficiently high relative to the portfolio’s mean return. Since loan
portfolio returns are very skewed to the left, this can occur for debt levels well below the mean return.
3 For theoretic treatments, see Dell’Arricia, Friedman, and Marquez (1999), Marquez (1997),
Dell’Arricia (1998), and Gehrig (1998). Shaffer (1998) finds supporting empirical evidence.
2
prove to be bad, which is precisely when the bank itself is most in danger of failing. This may expose the
bank to a variant of the Myers (1977) underinvestment problem: if in good times problem loans are so
infrequent that the ex post benefit of monitoring is less than its ex ante cost, the bank may be tempted to
forego monitoring, pocketing cost savings in good times and defaulting on its debt in bad times. Because
investors anticipate such “risk-shifting” behavior and demand a higher rate to compensate, the bank ends up
internalizing any decrease in loan returns from not monitoring. Thus, in choosing whether to diversify, the
bank weighs the impact of diversification on its incentive to monitor its loans and on its chance of failure.
First, consider the impact of diversification when the bank’s ability to monitor loans is constant
across different sectors. Such “pure” diversification increases the central tendency of the bank’s return
distribution, which generally reduces the bank’s chance of failure; also, if underinvestment in monitoring
is an issue, greater central tendency improves monitoring incentives. Nevertheless, if its loans have
sufficiently low exposure to sector downturns (“downside”), a specialized bank has a low probability of
failure, so the benefit of diversification is slight. Also, if its loans have sufficiently high downside,
diversification can actually increase the bank’s chance of failure: a downturn in one sector is enough to make
a diversified bank fail, and a diversified bank is exposed to more sectors than a specialized one.
2 Thus, all
else equal, diversification’s benefits are greatest when the bank’s loans have moderate levels of downside
risk and when the bank’s monitoring incentives need strengthening.
Furthermore, all else may not be equal. By definition, diversification involves moving into economic
sectors or geographic regions that differ from the bank’s home base. Effective loan monitoring requires that
the lending institution have a thorough understanding of these differences, but building such organizational
knowledge takes time and effort. Also, recent work suggests that a bank entering a sector with several
established banks faces increased adverse selection in its pool of borrowers (the “Winner’s Curse”).
3 Thus,
regardless of the bank’s efforts, loans in the new sector are likely to perform worse than loans in the bank’s
home sector. Worse performance for new sector loans also makes diversification more likely to increase the
bank’s chance of failure and less likely to improve the bank’s monitoring incentives; indeed, diversification
may even undermine incentives to monitor home sector loans. Overall, diversification is more likely to be
unattractive, particularly when the bank’s home sector loans have either low or high downside.
Lack of knowledge about new markets is not the only way in which diversification can harm the
effectiveness of loan monitoring. Some sectors simply offer lower returns to monitoring. For example, some3
industries have few tangible assets, and some regions or countries have fewer creditors’ rights; both reduce
recoveries from troubled loans, regardless of the bank’s monitoring efforts. Also, if increased diversification
requires increased size, diversification may involve increased layers of management and free rider problems,
which could lower monitoring effectiveness in all sectors.
In debating diversification’s pros and cons, the features that distinguish banks and other lenders from
nonfinancial firms are lenders’ greater use of debt finance (leverage) and the way in which lenders’ efforts
affect their return distributions. With high leverage, worst-case outcomes loom large both in terms of
underinvestment problems and in terms of outright failure. Loan monitoring improves returns not by
increasing best-case outcomes but by reducing the frequency and severity of worst-case outcomes: after all,
a loan cannot earn more than its stated principal and interest, but effective monitoring may stop a troubled
loan from deteriorating too far. Although pure diversification tends to reduce the frequency of both worst-
case and best-case outcomes, diversification that lessens monitoring effectiveness may increase the
frequency and severity of worst-case outcomes, increasing failure probability and underinvestment problems.
A bank can reduce its probability of failure and alleviate any underinvestment problems by raising
equity capital, but equity finance has a number of costs relative to debt finance (see Section 6). Although the
conventional view is that greater diversification means less need for costly equity capital, my analysis
suggests that sometimes the opposite is true: a more diversified bank may have greater relative need for
capital, especially if diversification involves expansion into sectors where the bank is less effective.
Similarly, the conventional view is that greater competition has increased the need for banks to
diversify: lower profits leave less margin for error, so diversification provides a necessary reduction in risk.
Again, my analysis suggests that the opposite can be true. For example, increased competition may magnify
the “Winner’s Curse” problem faced on entry into a new sector, making diversification very costly. Banks
facing greater competition may therefore find it more attractive to specialize.
As discussed in Section 7, my results help motivate a number of actual cases, including many of
those mentioned at the outset. Consider Continental Illinois: upon closer examination, its downfall was due
as much to lax credit standards as to lack of diversification, and indeed Continental’s loans had precisely
those features for which my model predicts that a specialized bank has greater incentive problems than a
diversified bank. By contrast, credit card lending in the 1990s had several features which favor specialists
over more diversified rivals, which is consistent with the superior performances of CapitalOne, First USA,
and MBNA, and with that of Citicorp, which chose credit cards as one of a few areas of focus after rapid
diversification in the 1980s produced the disastrous results mentioned earlier.
A more general point is that credit exposure on most bank loans is in large part endogenous; it is
greatly affected by the intensity and efficacy of the bank’s monitoring. Thus, the recent move at larger banks
to manage portfolio-wide credit risk using quantitative products such as J.P. Morgan’s CreditMetrics or4 See Yanelle (1989, 1997), Winton (1995, 1997), Matutes and Vives (1996), Yosha (1997), Gehrig
(1995), and Daltung (1996). Hellwig (1998) differs by allowing the bank to choose the size of each loan; thus
a bank can “specialize” and save on fixed monitoring costs by increasing loan size, albeit at the cost of less
diversification. Shaffer (1994) points out that diversification by merging independent banks actually
increases the odds that all banks fail simultaneously, increasing systemic risk.
5 In addition to the previously-mentioned papers on the winner’s curse problem facing new entrants,
Boot and Thakor (1998) examine incentives to specialize in the face of increased competition.
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Credit Suisse’s CreditRisk
+ must be taken with a grain of salt. In these models, loan risk is exogenous,
making portfolio risk a mechanical function of allocation across various loan sectors (see Gordy, 1998). To
the extent that the banks that provide the loan history data on which these products are based tend to be those
which have been active in a given sector for some time, and successful enough to survive and be willing to
share their history, the data may well represent above-average lending performance. An institution that uses
such data to assess the pros and cons of moving into a new sector understates the risk it will face due to its
lack of expertise. Similar caveats apply to regulators using such data to assess institutions’ risk.
For regulators seeking to control institutional moral hazard caused by deposit insurance or other
government guarantees, a related point is that “risk-shifting” through lack of monitoring should be as great
a concern as risk-shifting through lack of diversification. Furthermore, poor monitoring is likely to be harder
to observe on a timely basis than portfolio diversification, and thus harder to control. Nor is it correct to
assume that monitoring incentives always increase with diversification: aggressive diversification into new
sectors can undermine monitoring incentives just as much as excessive concentration in a few risky sectors.
This suggests a need for more research on the relationships between monitoring expertise, monitoring
incentives, and loan portfolio composition.
Finally, while this paper focuses on the implications of diversification for lending institutions, other
financial institutions face the same combination of high leverage, portfolio exposures that are greatly skewed
to the left, and potential gains to specialization; examples include property and liability insurers, credit
insurers, and investment banks that specialize in high yield bonds. Thus, these institutions may face similar
tradeoffs between diversification and specialization.
There have been a number of papers on bank diversification incentives, but most assume that loans
are uncorrelated and diversification increases automatically with bank size.
4 Similarly, although there has
been some work on specialization and loan performance, these papers do not address monitoring incentives
or aggregate portfolio risk.
5 A somewhat closer paper is Besanko and Thakor (1993), who model insured
banks allocating loans across two uncorrelated sectors. Diversified banks forfeit gains from risk-shifting but
increase their odds of surviving to collect informational rents on continuing lending relationships; free entry
reduces these rents, discouraging diversification. My paper differs from all of these by incorporating banks’5
role as active monitors and by examining how varying degrees of expertise, loan risk, or correlation between
different sectors affect both the decision to diversify and subsequent monitoring performance.
The paper’s structure is as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic model and examines the behavior
of an undiversified bank. The next two sections examine the impact of diversification when the bank’s
monitoring incentives are not an issue; in Section 3 the bank has the same monitoring expertise in both
sectors, while in Section 4 the bank has less expertise in the new sector. Section 5 examines diversification
when the bank’s monitoring incentives are weaker and underinvestment may be a problem. Section 6 looks
at incorporating bank equity capital, competitive considerations, and unobservable allocations of loans across
sectors. Section 7 applies the model to actual cases. Section 8 discusses policy implications and concludes.
2. Basic  Model
A. Assumptions
A financial institution operates for a single period. At the start of the period, it raises 1 unit of funds
from investors by issuing debt with face value (principal and interest) D; in Section 6 I will allow for equity
to be issued as well. Investors are competitive, risk-neutral, and require a total expected return of 1 per unit
invested. The funds that the institution raises are then invested in loans. At the end of the period, loan returns
are realized; the institution then either repays D if it has sufficient funds, or else fails, in which case investors
seize its assets. Failure results in a deadweight loss b for the investors; this represents various costs of
financial distress that diminish the value of the institution’s assets.
Although I will generally refer to the institution as a bank, I do not assume that its debt is insured;
the institution could be an uninsured finance company or a commercial bank that pays a fair price for deposit
insurance. What is critical is that the institution relies on debt for (most of) its funding, that it pays a fair
price in equilibrium for its funding, and that its failure is costly. James (1991) presents evidence that direct
costs of bank failure can be quite substantial (roughly 10% of assets); Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993)
present evidence of significant indirect costs.
The institution (henceforth “bank”) can allocate its loans across two sectors, 1 and 2. Let α indicate
the fraction of Sector 1 loans in the bank’s portfolio; for simplicity, I restrict α to be 0, ½ , or 1. The
contractual payment (principal plus interest) per unit loaned is fixed exogenously at R > 1; later, in Section
6, I examine how R is determined by competitive considerations. Within a given sector, a fraction qs of loans
are repaid in full, while the rest are problem loans. The fraction qs of successful loans depends on the sector’s
state s, which is either good (G) or bad (B); qG > qB. For simplicity, the bank is assumed to be perfectly
diversified within any sector to which it lends, and so the fractions qG and qB perfectly represent the relative
proportions by sector of good and bad loans within the bank’s loan portfolio. Henceforth, when I refer to
“diversification,” I am referring to diversification across sectors, i.e., α = 1.6 An alternative interpretation is that successful monitoring gives the bank a probability L/R of
preventing an “iffy” loan from becoming a problem.
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Each sector has probability p A½ of being in the good state G, and 1-p of being in the bad state B,
so q d L pqG + (1-p)qB is the probability that a loan is repaid in full. The two sectors’ states may be correlated.
Let φst be the joint probability of Sector 1 being in state s and Sector 2 being in state t (henceforth state “st”).
Because the sectors are symmetric, the “cross-probabilities” φGB and φBG are equal; henceforth, I refer to both
as φBG. The following lemma establishes some useful facts about this distribution.
Lemma 2.1 (Facts about Joint Distribution of Sector Returns). (i) φGG + φBG = p and φBG + φBB = 1>p.
(ii) The correlation between the two sectors equals (φGG>p
2)/(p>p
2); since p A ½, the minimum correlation
is 1 > p
-1 @ 0, and the maximum is 1.
(iii) Holding p constant, increasing sector correlation increases φGG and φBB and decreases φBG.
Proof: see Appendix A.
In addition to allocating loans across sectors, the bank can monitor loans at a cost of c per unit
loaned. Monitoring must begin right after loans are made; it lets the bank spot troubled borrowers before their
situations become hopeless, allowing the bank to increase its average recovery by invoking protective
covenants, renegotiating maturing loans, forcing foreclosure, and so forth. If the bank has expertise in a loan
sector, then it is always successful in spotting problem loans in that sector when it monitors. If a bank does
not have such expertise, it is only successful with probability γ < 1. If successfully monitored, problem loans
pay some amount L < 1 < R; otherwise, they pay nothing.
6 It follows that if the bank has expertise in a sector
and monitors (choice “M”), then when the sector is in state s the bank’s loans to that sector will yield
r(M,s) L qsR + (1-qs)L > c.
If the bank monitors but lacks expertise because it is new to the sector (choice “N”), its loans yield
r(N,s) L qsR + (1-qs)γL > c.
Finally, if the bank does not monitor (choice “U” for “unmonitored”), its loans yield
r(U,s) L qsR.
Note that monitoring adds most value when the sector state is bad. Also, regardless of its monitoring choice,7
π(α,σ1,σ2,D) L ˆsMSG,B[ ˆtMSG,B[ φst] max Sα]r(σ1,s) (1>α)]r(σ2,t)> D, 0[ .
the bank does better in the good state than in the bad (for any σ M {M,N,U}, r(σ,G) > r(σ,B)).
Remark 1: Incidence of monitoring costs. My expressions for the return on monitored loans assume
that monitoring costs are pecuniary, reducing bank assets, and that the costs occur at the end of the
monitoring period. Having monitoring costs instead reduce the bank’s investable funds would complicate
some expressions without changing the essential results of the paper. A more critical assumption is that costs
reduce bank assets before debtholders are paid. In reality, costs of monitoring take the form of effort on the
part of the bank’s management, employees, and directors; while much of these costs are compensated on an
ongoing basis through salaries and directors’ fees, some are compensated ex post through salary increases,
bonuses, and grants of stock or stock options – compensation that may well be lost in the event the bank fails,
when jobs are lost and stock becomes worthless. If monitoring costs only become pecuniary on such an ex
post basis, the underinvestment problem becomes more severe: the bank’s decision makers now bear the
costs of monitoring regardless of outcome, whereas in the current model costs are shared with debtholders
if the bank fails. I return to this issue in Remark 3 in Section 5 below.
Remark 2: Banks as loan screeners. Although most of my discussion focuses on banks monitoring
existing loans, banks also screen borrowers when making loans. The model is easily adapted to cover
screening. Suppose that some loans end up being good, yielding R, while some end up bad, yielding 0. If the
proportion of good loans in a sector is qs depending on the state of the sector, a bank that does not screen
receives qsR. If screening at cost c allows the bank to increase its proportion of good loans to qs+(1>qs)(L/R),
one arrives at the same revenue stream for the bank given above; L/R now reflects the bank’s ability to
exclude bad loans. Since the proportion of bad loans increases when the sector state is bad (1>qB exceeds
1>qG), screening has more value (ex post) in the bad state. Effectively, this assumes that screening reveals
firm characteristics associated with greater vulnerability to negative shocks, which are more likely to occur
when the sector as a whole is in bad shape.
Returning to the basic model, it follows that the expected profit of a bank that issues debt with face
value D, allocates α of its loans to Sector 1, and chooses monitoring strategy σi for each sector i M {1,2} is
The next assumption concerns the relative performance of monitored and unmonitored loans:7 Although assuming that monitoring costs reduce bank assets makes the cost observable ex post, the
bank’s owners could always consume c and claim it was spent on monitoring. Alternatively, monitoring costs
could be nonpecuniary, as discussed in Remark 1. For simplicity, I abstract from these issues.
8 This is equivalent to having the bank issue the debt with face value 1 and a maturity right after
loans are allocated; since the bank has no cash when the debt matures, the debt must be rolled over at a rate
that reflects the bank’s risk based on its loan allocation and expected monitoring efforts.
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ˆsMSG,B[ ˆtMSG,B[ φst] min Sα]r(σ1(α),s)  (1>α)]r(σ2(α),t), D(α)[
> b ] Prob Sα]r(σ1(α),s)  (1>α)]r(σ2(α),t) < D(α)[  1;
Assumption 1 (Loan Risk and the Value of Monitoring). The following restrictions hold:
(i) p·r(M,G) + (1>p)·r(M,B) = q dR+(1>q d)L > c A 1+(1>p)b (monitored loans have positive net present value);
(ii) (1>q d)L > c (ex ante, monitoring is more attractive than not monitoring);
(iii) qBR < 1 < qGR (unmonitored loans create some risk of bank failure).
The critical assumptions are that monitored loans are worth funding, that the gains from monitoring when
the state is bad more than outweigh any net costs of monitoring when the state is good, and that unmonitored
loans create some risk of bank failure. These assumptions leave room for considerable variety: for example,
unmonitored loans may be worth funding (q dR A 1+(1>p)b), monitoring may be unattractive in the good state
((1>qG)L < c), or monitoring may leave the bank with a risk of default (r(M,B) < 1).
Finally, the ease with which investors can observe the bank’s actions must be specified. Since it is
difficult for outsiders to directly observe the lending process that a bank is following, I assume that the
bank’s monitoring choices cannot be observed by outside investors. This rules out contracting based on the
bank’s actual monitoring choice.
7 By contrast, since banks in many developed countries do report
information on loan concentrations at regular intervals (albeit for broad groupings and with lags), and
massive reallocations of existing loans are likely to be time-consuming and hard to conceal, I initially assume
that the bank’s loan allocation across sectors is observable. In Section 6, I consider the case where it is
difficult to observe loan allocations, as might be more representative of banks in developing countries.
For simplicity, assume that the bank’s debt face value is conditioned on its loan allocation.
8 In this
setting, an equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game in which the bank first chooses its loan
allocation, investors competitively set D, and the bank then makes monitoring decisions. More specifically,
Definition 1. An equilibrium consists of loan allocation α M {0, ½, 1}, monitoring strategies σ1(α) and σ2(α)
as functions of α, and debt face value D(α) as a function of α, such that:
(i) given any α and resulting D(α), the bank chooses σ1 and σ2 to maximize its profits π(α,σ1,σ2,D(α));
(ii) for any α and resulting σ1(α), and σ2(α), investors must break even on their investment; i.e.,
(iii) the bank chooses its allocation α to maximize its expected profits π(α,σ1(α),σ2(α),D(α)).9 Given the assumption of symmetry between sectors, it is easy to show that π(α,σ1,σ2,D) =
π(1>α,σ2,σ1,D). Thus, results for a bank that focuses on Sector 2 are the same as those derived for a bank that
focuses on Sector 1.
10 Actually, if 1 @ r(M,B) < 1 + (1>p)b, both D = 1 and D = D
M are consistent with equilibrium; the
higher rate makes the bank fail more often, which is self-fulfilling. As noted below, I focus on the Pareto
optimal equilibrium, which in this case is the one with D = 1.
9
Since investors have rational expectations about how the bank will behave, the debt face value that
they demand compensates them for any equilibrium lack of monitoring and costs of bank failure. Thus, ex
ante, the bank’s expected profit equals [expected loan portfolio returns] less [1+expected failure costs], and
the bank fully internalizes the impact of its monitoring choice and any costs of bank failure. It follows that
the bank would like to monitor (see Assumption 1(ii)) and keep its chance of failure as low as possible; the
problem, of course, is that the bank must have incentive to monitor after its debt has been issued.
In my analysis, I adopt the following strategy. First, I examine the equilibrium monitoring decision
and failure probability of an undiversified (“specialized”) bank. Then, in the three sections that follow, I
explore monitoring and failure probability for a diversified bank as a function of both its degree of expertise
in each sector and the strength of its monitoring incentives; comparison with the benchmark case of a
specialized bank leads to the bank’s optimal decision on whether to diversify or specialize.
B.  Benchmark Case: Undiversified (“Specialized”) Bank
Suppose that the bank has allocated all of its loans to Sector 1, and that it has expertise in that sector,
so that when it monitors it always identifies problem loans.
9 It follows that π(1,σ1, ],D) = p]max {r(σ,G)>D,0}
+ (1>p)]max {r(σ,B)>D, 0}. The next proposition outlines when equilibrium monitoring (σ(1) = M) is
feasible in this setting, along with associated debt face values D(1) and probabilities of bank failure.
Proposition 2.2 (Monitoring Equilibria for Specialized Bank). Suppose that the bank allocates all of its loans
to Sector 1, and that the bank has expertise in that sector.
(i) Suppose (1>qG)L > c. Then in equilibrium the bank always monitors. If r(M,B) A 1, then the face value
of the bank’s debt equals 1 and the bank never fails; otherwise, the debt’s face value equals D
M =
p
>1{1>(1>p)][r(M,B)>b)]} > 1, and the bank fails with probability 1>p.
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(ii) Suppose (1>qG)L < c. If (1>q d)L>c A (1>p)][1>r(U,B)] (equivalently, r(M,B) A 1>[p/(1>p)][(1>qG)L>c]),
there is an equilibrium where the bank monitors, its debt face value is 1, and it never fails. Otherwise, the
bank does not monitor in equilibrium.
Proof: see Appendix A.
In part (i) of the proposition, returns from monitored loans are always higher than returns from
unmonitored loans, regardless of the state of the sector, so the bank always monitors. In part (ii), monitoring
is unattractive (ex post) when the sector is in the good state, leaving open the possibility of risk-shifting by11 See Diamond and Dybvig (1993), as well as Yanelle (1989, 1997) and Winton (1995, 1997).
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the bank. At a minimum, a monitoring equilibrium requires that the bank be able to repay its debt even in the
bad state (r(M,B) A 1); otherwise, the bank only receives profits in the good state, which is when not
monitoring dominates. Also, the bank must prefer monitoring and repaying investors in all states over
cheating investors by issuing low-priced debt (D(1) = 1) and then not monitoring. The expected gain from
monitoring is (1>q d)L>c; this must exceed the expected gain from risk-shifting, which is (1>p)(1>r(U,B)),
the expected shortfall on the bank’s debt payments in the bad state. The rearranged version of this condition
confirms that it is more binding than the requirement that r(M,B) A 1.
As outlined in Proposition B.1 of Appendix B, other equilibria may exist; the bank may not monitor
at all, failing in the bad state, or the bank may randomize between monitoring and not monitoring. The first
of these equilibria can coexist with the monitoring equilibrium of Proposition 2.2(ii); the randomized
equilibria only exist when the monitoring equilibrium exists. Multiple equilibria are quite common in models
of banking, and it follows that investor beliefs are critical.
11 Since this paper focuses on the impact of
diversification on bank failure and bank incentives to monitor, when multiple equilibria exist, I focus on the
Pareto optimal equilibrium, which is the one with the most monitoring and the lowest debt face value.
To summarize, a specialized bank monitors its loans in two cases: when monitoring loans is attractive
even in the good sector state, or when monitoring’s effect in the bad state is powerful enough that the bank
avoids default by a margin high enough to make risk-shifting unattractive. It is easy to show that increases
in recoveries L from monitoring or decreases in monitoring costs c make both cases more likely. Increases
in the quality qG of loans in the good state make the first case less likely because monitoring is less attractive
in the good state. Finally, increases in the quality qB of loans in the bad state or the stated rate R on loans
make the second case more likely, since they increase the return on monitored loans in the bad state.
I have thus far assumed that the bank has expertise in its sector of specialization. It is easy to extend
the analysis to the case where the bank has not yet acquired such expertise; not surprisingly, since its
monitoring is less effective, a bank without sector expertise is less likely to monitor and more likely to fail.
Corollary 2.3 (Equilibria for Undiversified Bank Without Sector Expertise). Suppose that the bank allocates
all of its loans to Sector 1, and that the bank does not have expertise in that sector. Then all the results and
conditions in Proposition 2.2 hold, with L replaced by γL. As γ decreases (sector expertise is more critical
for effective monitoring), the parameter range where monitoring is an equilibrium outcome decreases, as does
the range where the bank never fails.
Proof: obvious.
With these results on a specialized bank’s behavior as a benchmark, I now turn to the question of11
whether diversification improves bank performance.
3.  “Pure” Diversification and Bank Failure
My analysis of the impact of diversification begins with the case where the bank’s monitoring ability
is constant across sectors. The common intuition is that such “pure” diversification makes a bank safer,
reducing its failure probability. My analysis shows that there are caveats to this intuition; diversification may
not help much if loans’ exposure to a sector downturn (“downside”) is low, and it may even increase the
bank’s failure probability if loans’ downside is sufficiently high.
To simplify exposition, in this section I focus on the case where the ex post gain to monitoring in
the good state (1>qG)L exceeds the cost of monitoring c. I deal with the other case in Section 5. As shown
in Proposition 2.2(i), (1>qG)L > c implies that, regardless of a sector’s realized state, monitoring always
dominates not monitoring; thus the bank always monitors, and its decision to diversify or specialize is based
solely on which strategy results in a lower equilibrium probability of bank failure.
Proposition 3.1 (Pure Diversification When Monitoring Incentives Are Strong). Suppose that (1>qG)L > c.
Then the bank always monitors all loans. Let D(1) = D
s be the debt face value investors require from a
specialized bank, and let D(½) = D
d be the debt face value investors require from a diversified bank.
(i) If r(M,B) A 1, then regardless of its diversification strategy the bank never fails, and D
s = D
d = 1. The bank
is indifferent between diversifying and specializing.
(ii) If r(M,B) < 1, and ½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)] A A L (1>φBB)
>1{1>φBB][r(M,B)>b]}, a diversified bank fails less
often than a specialized bank (probability φBB versus 1>p), and D
d = A. Also, 1 < A < D
s = D
M from
Proposition 2.2. The bank prefers to diversify.
(iii) If r(M,B) < 1, and ½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)] < A, a diversified bank fails more often than a specialized bank
(probability 1>φGG versus 1>p), and D
d > A. The bank prefers to specialize.
Proof: see Appendix A.
In part (i) of the proposition, a sector downturn is not too risky (r(M,B) exceeds 1), so even a
specialized bank is relatively safe, and diversification has little value in reducing expected costs of bank
failure. Conversely, in part (iii), the downside risk of loans is so high that a downturn in even one out of two
sectors is enough to cause a diversified bank to fail; in this case, diversification exposes the bank to more
potential sector downturns, increasing its chance of failure. The greatest gains from diversification come
when the downside risk of loans is moderate: high enough to expose the bank to significant threat of failure
if it specializes, but not so high that a single sector downturn can bring down the whole diversified bank.
Though it may seem counterintuitive, the result that pure diversification may increase failure
probability is a simple consequence of the fact that diversification increases the loan return distribution’s
central tendency. If the face value of the bank’s debt is high enough, this means that diversification increases12 Pure diversification induces a mean-preserving contraction in the bank’s portfolio returns; since
debtholders’ returns are a concave function of the bank’s loan portfolio return, this increases their expected
payments. See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
13 Diversification may even increase the face value that investors require, although this requires both
that diversification increase the bank’s chance of failure (holding debt face value constant) and that
deadweight costs of bank failure b are sufficiently high. In this model, D
d exceeds D
s if case (iii) of
Proposition 3.1 applies and b exceeds (q dR+(1>q d)L>c)>1; the proof is available upon request.
14 By contrast, if loan returns were normally distributed, an increase in bank failure from
diversification would require that the face value of the bank’s debt exceeded the mean loan return. This
would in turn imply a base failure probability of over 50%, which would be rather implausible.
12
the odds that loan returns will be below this value. There is some offset in that pure diversification increases
investors’ share of bank portfolio returns for any given face value of bank debt, lowering the face value that
they require.
12 Nevertheless, expected returns in failure and the probability of failure are not perfectly
correlated; in part (iii) of the proposition, a diversified bank may have a lower face value of debt than a
specialized bank yet fail more often.
13
The “counterintuitive” case is most likely when the bank’s loan returns have significant downside
risk, since this both increases the face value of the bank’s debt and increases the damage from any one sector
being a downturn. This result is also made more likely by the fact that the distribution of loan returns tends
to be heavily skewed to the left; there is a high chance that loans are repaid in full, but default leads to a wide
range of possible low outcomes. In this model, skewness of loan returns means 1>p is well below 50%, so
the bank’s expected return p]r(M,G)+(1>p)r(M,B) exceeds ½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)] by a difference that increases
as the difference between good and bad sector returns increases. Since a diversified bank’s return when one
sector is in a downturn is ½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)], it follows that if average loan returns are not too much greater
than the face value of the bank’s debt, a downturn in one sector may be enough to cause the bank to fail,
especially if sectors show high cyclical risk.
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Example: suppose that p = 95% and φGG = 92%. Then φBG = 3%, φBB = 2%, and correlation between sectors
is .368. Suppose also that R = 1.02, L = .70, qG = 99%, qB = 80%, c = .005, and b = .10. Then (1>qG)L
exceeds c, and (1>q d)L>c = .0087 > 0; also, r(M,B) = .951, r(M,G) = 1.012 and the expected return on
monitored loans is 1.009 > 1 + (1>p)b = 1.005. Since ½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)] = .981 < 1 < A = 1.003, a
diversified bank fails 8% of the time, while a specialized bank fails only 5% of the time.
The discreteness of the binomial setting does play a role here; since a given sector’s risk is “all or
nothing,” the increase in central tendency shows up in the two “cross-states” where one sector is good and
one is bad. If returns in these cross-states are below the face value of the bank’s debt, diversification causes
a large increase in failure probability. Simulations using more realistic continuous distributions show more13
muted effects, as one would expect. Nevertheless, substantial skewness does persist in large portfolios (see
Brealey et al., 1983), and even when failure probabilities do not increase with diversification, they can be
a “flatter” function of diversification than intuition based on normal distributions might suggest (see Carey,
1998). This in turn suggests that if diversification has other negative effects (as discussed in the next section),
it is more likely to be harmful overall.
Since the three cases of Proposition 3.1 play an important role throughout my analysis, it is useful
to label them as follows:
Definition 2. Recall that r(M,B) is the return on monitored loans when the sector is in its bad state.
(i) If r(M,B) A 1, monitored loans have low downside.
(ii) If r(M,B) < 1, and ½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)] A A L (1>φBB)
>1{1>φBB][r(M,B)>b]}, monitored loans have
moderate downside.
(iii) If r(M,B) < 1, and ½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)] < A, monitored loans have high downside.
One consequence of Proposition 3.1 is that changes in loan risk and other parameters have
nonmonotonic effects on the value of diversification across sectors. The following corollary illustrates this.
Corollary 3.2 (Comparative Statics When Monitoring Incentives Are Strong). Suppose (1>qG)L > c.
(i) Suppose a bank’s loans have moderate downside, so that diversification reduces bank failure probability.
The following changes make it more likely that bank loans have high downside, so that diversification
increases bank failure probability:(a) decreases in the bank’s loan returns r(M,B) or r(M,G) (from decreases
in R, L, qG , or qB); (b) a mean-preserving increase in sector risk (e.g., qG rises and qB falls in such a way that q d
is unchanged); (c) increases in the cost of bank failure b; (d) increases in sector correlation. Increases in
sector correlation also diminish the impact of diversification on expected costs of bank failure.
(ii) Suppose a bank’s loans have low downside, so that diversification does not affect the bank’s failure
probability. The following changes make it more likely that loans have moderate downside, so that
diversification reduces bank failure probability: (a) decreases in loan returns r(M,B) in a sector downturn
(from decreases in R, L or qB); (b) a mean-preserving increase in sector risk as per (i.b).
Proof: see Appendix A.
Figure 1 illustrates some of these results. It shows the impact of diversification in bank failure as a
function of the stated rate R on loans and the degree of sectoral risk (measured by qG>qB, holding average
loan quality q d constant); all other parameters are as in the example just given, and (1>qG)L > c for all values
in the graph. Increases in loan returns (here, from increases in R) make the bank safer, but this can either lead
to the situation where diversification reduces the chance of bank failure or the situation where diversification
has no effect. Also, as the sectoral risk of loans increases, the size of the regions where diversification either
reduces or increases the bank’s chance of failure increase.
Although I have been assuming that the bank has expertise in both sectors, it is easy to extend the14
results of this section to the case where the bank lacks expertise in both sectors. The only question is whether
loans monitored by a bank without expertise have low, moderate, or high downside risk, defined in analogy
to Definition 2. Clearly, lower efficiency γ makes loans have greater downside; however, if lower efficiency
causes loans to have moderate rather than low downside, diversification becomes more attractive, while if
lower efficiency causes loans to have high downside, diversification becomes less attractive.
To summarize the results of this section, diversification that does not impair the bank’s monitoring
ability may reduce a bank’s probability of failure. On the other hand, if loans have relatively low downside,
a specialized bank is already safe, while if loans have sufficiently high downside, a diversified bank may fail
more often than a specialized bank. Thus, diversification’s benefits are greatest when loans have moderate
downside. Increasing the correlation between sectors diminishes gains from diversification, and high costs
of bank failure can have a similar effect. Other comparative statics depend critically on whether loans begin
with low, moderate, or high downside risk.
4.  Diversifying into Sectors Where Monitoring Is Less Effective
I now turn to the case where the bank diversifies from a sector where it has expertise into a sector
in which its monitoring is less effective (γ < 1). By definition, such a move must be less attractive than the
pure diversification analyzed in the previous section; returns to monitored loans in the new sector are worse
in any state, reducing the bank’s average loan returns and increasing the probability of bank failure. On the
other hand, the bank may not have many pure diversification opportunities: each sector has nuances that take
time to learn, and even if experienced lenders from other institutions are available, the bank’s management
has to learn some details of the new sector in order to do a good job of monitoring these lenders.
Furthermore, sectors that are less correlated with those in which the bank is already established are likely
to be less correlated because of differences in business environment and culture. Finally, if the new sector
is a developing economy or a new industry with many intangible assets (such as growth opportunities),
monitoring may be less effective due to lack of legal safeguards or good collateral; in this simple model,
lower recoveries L from monitoring troubled loans have the same effect as a decrease in efficiency γ.
As in the previous section, I assume that  (1>qG)L > c, so that the bank always monitors loans in its
home sector (Sector 1); in Section 5 I deal with the case where monitoring incentives are weaker. I also begin
by assuming that r(N,G) > r(U.G), so that monitoring new sector loans is attractive even when the new sector
(Sector 2) is in its good state. This is equivalent to requiring that (1>qG)γL > c; it implies that the bank
always monitors new sector loans, which slightly simplifies analysis without changing the key results. I will
discuss weakening this assumption later on.
In analogy with Definition 2, it is useful to categorize loans in the new sector by their returns in the
bad state, r(N,B), as follows:15
Definition 3. (i) If ½[r(M,B)+r(N,B)] A 1, new sector loans are said to have low downside.
(ii) If ½[r(M,B)+r(N,B)] < 1, and ½[r(M,G)+r(N,B)] A Az L (1>φBB)
>1{1+φBB]b>½φBB[r(M,B)+r(N,B)]}, new
sector loans are said to have moderate downside.
(iii) If ½[r(M,B)+r(N,B)] < 1, and ½[r(M,G)+r(N,B)] < Az, new sector loans are said to have high downside.
Analogous to Definition 2, a diversified bank never fails if new sector loans have low downside, fails only
when both sectors are in bad states if loans have moderate downside, and fails whenever the new sector is
in a bad state if new sector loans have high downside. Az is the face value of a diversified bank’s debt when
new sector loans have moderate downside. Since r(N,B) < r(M,B), it is immediate from Definition 2 that new
sector loans always have weakly worse downside than home sector loans and that Az > A.
The analysis of the previous section suggests that the benefits of pure diversification are greatest
when loans’ downside is moderate. By extension, diversification into areas where monitoring is less effective
should be most attractive when loans in the bank’s home sector have moderate downside: such diversification
may reduce the bank’s probability of failure, possibly offsetting worse average performance on new sector
loans. By contrast, if home sector loans have high downside, pure diversification is unattractive, and
diversification into a new sector with even greater downside and worse average performance should be even
less attractive. At the other extreme, if home sector loans have low downside, a specialized bank is safe, and
diversification into new sectors can only worsen average performance and perhaps increase the bank’s
probability of failure. The following proposition shows that this intuition is correct.
Proposition 4.1 (New Sector Diversification When Monitoring Incentives Are Stronger.) Suppose that a bank
has expertise only in Sector 1, and that (1>qG)γL > c. Then the bank always monitors all loans.
(i) Suppose Sector 1 loans have low downside. The bank prefers to specialize: a diversified bank has lower
average loan returns and may have a higher probability of failure.
(ii) Suppose Sector 1 loans and Sector 2 loans both have moderate downside. The bank prefers to diversify
if and only if ½(1>q d)(1>γ)L < φBG]b. Otherwise, it prefers to specialize.
(iii) Suppose Sector 2 loans have high downside. The bank prefers to specialize: a diversified bank has lower
average loan returns and fails with weakly higher probability.
Proof: see Appendix A.
When the bank’s incentive to monitor loans is not in doubt, diversification reduces average loan
returns: it does not affect the performance of home sector loans, and new sector loans perform worse than
home sector loans. Thus, for diversification to be at all attractive, it must reduce the bank’s probability of
failure. This cannot occur if home sector loans have low downside (part (i) of the proposition), since a
specialized bank never fails; indeed, since new sector loans have greater downside, the bank may fail more
often if it diversifies (specifically, if new sector loans have moderate or high downside). Similarly, if new
sector loans have high downside (part (iii)), a diversified bank fails whenever the new sector is in its bad15 As shown in the next section, if home sector loans have moderate downside, a diversified bank
monitors new sector loans if and only if p[(1>qG)γL>c]+φBG[(1>qB)γL>c]  A 2 φBG  ]max {Ak  >
½[r(U,B)+r(M,G)], 0}, which is less likely to hold as sector correlation increases or monitoring efficiency
decreases. If the bank does not monitor new sector loans, it prefers to diversify if and only if ½[(1>q s)L>c]
< φBG]b and ½[r(M,G)+r(U,B)] A A{ [ (1>φBB)
M1{1+φBB]b>½φBB[r(M,B)+r(U,B)]}; the second condition
essentially requires that unmonitored loans in the new sector have moderate downside.
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state, so the bank’s failure probability is at least 1>p, the failure probability of a specialized bank. Since new
sector loans have high downside whenever home sector loans do, the range where diversification is attractive
is smaller now than in the case of pure diversification.
It is only when new sector loans have moderate downside that diversification has a chance of
decreasing the bank’s failure probability. Furthermore, if diversification is to be preferred, the reduction in
expected costs of bank failure must outweigh the loss in average loan returns, which is the condition given
in part (ii) of the proposition. This condition is less likely to hold either as sector correlation increases
(reducing φBG) or as the effectiveness γ of monitoring new sector loans decreases.
Now suppose that r(N,G) < r(U,G), so that monitoring new sector loans is not attractive if the new
sector ends up in its good state. This may undermine the bank’s incentive to monitor new sector loans.
Nevertheless, the results of Proposition 4.1 are largely unchanged; indeed, if a diversified bank has sufficient
incentive to monitor new sector loans, the results are completely unchanged. Even if new sector loans are
not monitored, their average return is still lower and their downside is still higher than that of home sector
loans, and it follows that diversification is still unattractive if home sector loans have either low or high
downside. If home sector loans have moderate downside, and the downside of new sector loans is not too
high, diversification may reduce the bank’s failure probability by φBG; once more, if the bank is to prefer
diversification, the gain from lower expected failure costs must outweigh the reduction in average loan
return, which is now ½[(1>q s)L>c].
15 Comparative statics are qualitatively unchanged.
Thus, when diversification requires expansion into a sector where the bank’s monitoring is less
effective (either through lack of expertise or environmental factors) but monitoring incentives are not in
doubt, diversification is less attractive. Diversification must reduce the bank’s average loan returns, so the
only possible gain is a decrease in bank failure probability; because new sector loans have greater downside
than home sector loans, it is less likely that diversification reduces the probability of bank failure, and more
likely that it increases this probability. Indeed, diversification may increase the probability of failure even
when a bank that specializes in home sector loans is failure-free. Higher correlation between sectors or lower
monitoring effectiveness in the new sector increase the likelihood that diversification is unattractive.17
5.  Diversification and Monitoring Incentives
I now turn to the case where (1>qG)L < c, so that the benefit of monitoring in the good sector state
is less than its cost, and a specialized bank may underinvest in monitoring. In choosing whether to diversify
or specialize, a bank must now weigh the impact that diversification has on its monitoring incentives as well
as on its failure probability. As I show, diversification may improve monitoring incentives, which produces
two benefits: average loan returns increase, and monitoring reduces loans’ downside, decreasing the bank’s
chance of failure. It follows that the range where diversification is preferred over specialization tends to
increase when monitoring incentives are weaker. Nevertheless, it is still true that diversification tends to be
unattractive when loans have either very low downside or high downside. Moreover, if the bank’s
diversification opportunity involves worse monitoring efficacy, it is possible that diversification can actually
impair monitoring incentives in the bank’s home sector.
I begin with the case of pure diversification, where the diversification opportunity involves no
change in monitoring efficacy. In this setting, a diversified bank is more likely to monitor than a specialized
bank: pure diversification increases the central tendency of the bank’s loan return distribution, reducing the
bank’s risk-shifting gains by switching from monitoring to not monitoring, and thus making monitoring more
“incentive compatible.” (This result is weakened if some costs of monitoring are nonpecuniary – see Remark
3 below.) Because an increase in sector correlation lessens this increase in central tendency, it reduces the
gain in monitoring incentives. Also, as loan downside increases and the bank faces more risk of failure even
if it monitors, stronger conditions are needed to give the bank an incentive to monitor: increased risk of
failure means that the bank captures less of the benefit of monitoring, which only accrues in bad sector states.
These results can be seen in the next proposition.
Proposition 5.1 (Pure Diversification When Monitoring Incentives Are Weak). Suppose that (1>qG)L < c.
(i) If monitored loans have low downside (as per Definition 2), and (1>q s)L>c A (1>p)][1>r(U,B)] > h (where
h A 0 is defined in Appendix A), a diversified bank monitors all loans and never fails (D
d = 1). This condition
is less likely to hold as sector correlation increases. If (1>q s)L>c A (1>p)][1>r(U,B)], the bank is indifferent
between specializing and diversifying. Otherwise, the bank prefers to diversify.
(ii) If monitored loans have moderate downside and p[(1>qG)L>c]+φBG[(1>qB)L>c] A 2φBG ]max {A >
½[r(U,B)+r(M,G)], 0}, a diversified bank monitors all loans and fails with probability φBB (D
d = A). The
bank prefers to diversify. This condition is less likely to hold as sector correlation increases; also, a
diversified bank will not monitor all loans if p/(p+φBG) > 
^ p [ (1>qB>c/L)/(qG >qB) \ (p,1).
(iii) If monitored loans have either low or moderate downside, but (i) and (ii) do not hold, a diversified bank
will not monitor all loans. A diversified bank may monitor loans in one sector, in which case it fails with
probability 1>p; if so, the bank prefers to diversify. A diversified bank monitors no loans if φGG/p > 
^ p, which
is more likely as sector correlation increases.
(iv)If monitored loans have high downside, a diversified bank monitors no loans. The bank prefers to
specialize unless q sR < 1+(1>p)b, in which case banking is infeasible.
Proof: see Appendix A.16 If a diversified bank does not monitor any loans, diversification may increase the bank’s failure
probability; even though monitored loans have low or moderate downside, unmonitored loans have high
downside if ½[r(U,B)+r(U,G)] < (1>φBB)
M1{1>φBB][r(U,B)>b]}. In this case, the bank prefers to specialize.
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In part (i), monitored loans have low downside, and a bank that monitors never fails. The only
question is whether the overall gains from monitoring, (1>q s)L>c, exceed the gains from risk-shifting (the
right-hand side of the condition). This condition is less stringent than that faced by a specialized bank (see
Proposition 2.2(ii)). Thus, if loans have somewhat low downside, the bank may prefer diversification as a
means of committing to monitor: a specialized bank would not monitor and would fail when its sector was
in the bad state, while the diversified bank monitors all loans and never fails.
In part (ii), monitored loans have moderate downside, so even if it monitors all loans, the bank fails
when both sectors are in bad states. In choosing whether to monitor, the bank knows that its expected benefit
from monitoring is less than (1>q s)L>c because it is more likely to survive when sectors are in good states
and monitoring is (ex post) unattractive. Again, this expected benefit must exceed potential gains from risk-
shifting by monitoring fewer loans. If this condition is met, diversification has two benefits: the bank
monitors where a specialized bank does not, and its probability of failure falls from 1>p to φBB.
In the final condition in part (ii), 
^ p is the probability of the good sector state for which expected gains
to monitoring 
^ p[(1>qG)L>c] + (1>
^ p)[(1>qB)L>c] are zero. If the probability of good sector states conditional
on the bank not failing exceeds 
^ p, the bank’s ex post benefit from monitoring both sectors (after investors
have set the debt’s face value at A) is negative, so monitoring all loans is not an equilibrium outcome.
Part (iii) of the proposition shows that, even if a diversified bank does not have incentive to monitor
all of its loans, it is possible that it monitors loans in just one sector. As shown in Appendix A, this requires
that the bank fails whenever the unmonitored sector is in its bad state and survives whenever the unmonitored
sector is in its good state; if not, either gains to monitoring are so high that the bank monitors both sectors,
or else risk-shifting is so attractive that the bank does not monitor at all. In this case, a diversified bank fails
just as often as a specialized bank, but since a diversified bank monitors some loans and a specialized bank
does not, the bank prefers to diversify. Once more, if the probability of good sector states conditional on the
bank not failing (now φGG/p) exceeds 
^ p, even such limited monitoring is not incentive compatible.
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Finally, in part (iv), loans have high downside. Even if it monitors all loans, a diversified bank fails
unless both sectors are in their good states, which is when monitoring is most unattractive. The same is true
if the bank monitors only one sector. Thus, the bank will not monitor any loans in equilibrium. Since in this
case a diversified bank fails more often than a specialized bank (probability 1>φBG versus 1>p), and neither
strategy leads to monitoring, the bank is better off specializing.
Clearly, the comparative statics on the boundaries of the three regions of loan downside (low,
moderate, and high) are unchanged from Corollary 3.2. Results on monitoring incentives are somewhat more19
complex. As already noted, increased correlation between sectors lessens any gain in monitoring incentives
from diversification. If the sector risk of loans undergoes a mean-preserving spread, monitoring incentives
worsen: higher loan quality in good states makes monitoring even more unattractive in those states, while
lower quality in bad states increases losses to debtholders, making risk-shifting by not monitoring more
attractive. Increases in the loan rate R and recoveries from monitored loans L reduce risk-shifting incentives,
and increases in L also increase the benefits of monitoring.
As in Corollary 3.2, these changes may or may not make diversification more attractive. If monitored
loans start with low downside, a mean-preserving increase in sector risk can cause incentive problems for
specialized banks which diversification can still overcome; conversely, if loans start with moderate downside,
such an increase in risk may destroy incentive gains from diversification. Similarly, if loans have low
downside, increases in R or L can lessen incentive problems for a specialized bank to the point where
diversification adds little value, while the opposite may be true when loans have moderate downside.
Figure 2 illustrates some of these results: it shows the impact of diversification on monitoring as a
function of the stated rate R on loans and the degree of sectoral risk (again measured by qG>qB, holding
average loan quality q s constant). All other parameter values are as in the previous numerical example, except
that the cost of monitoring has been increased from .005 to .011; this increase makes monitoring unattractive
in the good sector state, so that monitoring incentives are an issue. For this example, a diversified bank either
monitors both sectors or none; the case where only one sector is monitored does not occur.
Remark 3: Nonpecuniary costs and monitoring incentives. As noted in Remark 1, underinvestment
in monitoring increases if some monitoring costs are nonpecuniary and thus are not passed through to
debtholders when the bank fails. If all monitoring costs take this form, (1>qG)L > c is no longer sufficient
for the bank to monitor: the bank bears monitoring costs in all states, but only recoups these costs when it
does not fail. A specialized bank always monitors if p(1>qG)L > c, since the good sector state alone provides
enough returns to justify monitoring; similarly, a diversified bank always monitors if φGG(1>qG)L > c. Since
p > φGG, it is now possible that a specialized bank that fails in the bad sector state would monitor while a
diversified bank would not. (Proof available on request.)
Now suppose as in Section 4 that the bank has expertise in Sector 1, its home sector, but not in Sector
2, the new sector. Since (1>qG)γL < (1>qG)L < c, monitoring incentives are an issue for new sector loans as
well as home sector loans. Indeed, it is possible that the overall gain to monitoring new sector loans is
negative, in which case they are not monitored, and any occurrence of strategy “N” (monitoring new sector17 Intuitively, monitoring new sector loans hurts average returns and reduces loans’ upside potential
(since r(N,G) < r(U,G)), so not monitoring always increases bank profits; the proof is available on request.
18 Also, Assumption 1 implies that r(U,G) > r(M,G) > r(N,G), r(M,B) > max {r(N,B), r(U,B)}, and
½[r(M,B)+r(N,G)] > ½[r(M,G)+r(N,B)].
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loans) in what follows would be replaced by “U” (do not monitor).
17 Since this would not alter my qualitative
results, I focus on the case where it is possible that the bank may monitor loans in its new sector:
Assumption 2 (Value of Monitoring When the Bank Lacks Expertise). (1>q s)γL A c; i.e., even if the bank lacks
expertise in a sector, unmonitored loans do not produce higher overall net returns than monitored loans.
An immediate consequence of Assumption 2 is that (1>qB)γL > c, so that r(N,B) > r(U,B); i.e., new sector
loans have less downside if they are monitored than if they are not monitored.
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Proposition 5.2 below gives detailed results on the choice between specialization and diversification
in this setting. Although the details are lengthy, the intuition largely combines the gist of Proposition 4.1
(diversification into a new sector) with that of Proposition 5.1 (pure diversification when monitoring
incentives are weaker).
Proposition 5.2 (New Sector Diversification When Monitoring Incentives Are Weaker.) Suppose that a bank
has expertise only in Sector 1, and that (1>qG)L < c.
(i) If Sector 1 loans have low downside and (1>q s)L>c A (1>p)][1>r(U,B)], the bank prefers to specialize:
diversification reduces average loan returns, may increase the bank’s failure probability, and may destroy
the bank’s incentive to monitor Sector 1 loans. Negative effects are more likely as sector correlation
increases or as monitoring effectiveness γ decreases.
(ii) If Sector 2 loans have low downside but (1>q s)L>c < (1>p)][1>r(U,B)] and (1>q s)γL>c  A
(1>p)][1>r(U,B)]>hk (where hk A 0 is given in Appendix A), a diversified bank monitors all loans and never
fails. The bank prefers to diversify. This case is less likely as sector correlation increases or as γ decreases.
(iii) If Sector 2 loans have moderate downside, (i) does not hold, and p[(1>qG)γL>c]+φBG[(1>qB)γL>c] A
2φBG ]max {Ak > ½[r(U,B)+r(M,G)], 0}, a diversified bank monitors all loans and fails with probability φBB.
The bank prefers to diversify. This condition is less likely to hold as sector correlation increases or as γ
decreases. A diversified bank will not monitor all loans if p/(p+φBG) > ˜ p [ [1>qB>c/(γL)]/(qG >qB) \ (p,
^ p).
(iv) If (i) does not hold, and either (a) Sector 2 loans have low or moderate downside, but conditions (ii-iii)
do not hold, or (b) Sector 2 loans have high downside but Sector 1 loans do not, then a diversified bank will
not monitor all loans. It may monitor Sector 1 loans, in which case it fails with probability 1>p; if so, the
bank prefers to diversify. A diversified bank monitors no loans if φGG/p > 
^ p, which is more likely as sector
correlation increases.
(v) Suppose Sector 1 loans have high downside. Then a diversified bank monitors no loans, and the bank
prefers to specialize unless q sR < 1+(1>p)b, in which case banking is infeasible.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Intuitively, if home sector loans have sufficiently low downside, (part (i) of the proposition), a21
specialized bank monitors its loans and never fails. Here, diversification can only be harmful: if new sector
monitoring effectiveness γ is low, a diversified bank may fail more often; if sector correlation is high or
monitoring effectiveness is low, a diversified bank may not monitor either sector.
In parts (ii) and (iii), the risk of new sector loans (and thus of home sector loans) is low or moderate,
but home sector loans are risky enough that a specialized bank does not monitor and so fails with probability
1>p. If sector correlation is not too high and monitoring effectiveness is not too low, a diversified bank may
monitor all of its loans, in which case the bank prefers to diversify: diversification improves average loan
returns and reduces the chance of bank failure to either zero or φBB. In both (ii) and (iii), the requirements
for monitoring all loans are stronger than those in the case of pure diversification with low or moderate
downside (Proposition 5.1(i) and (ii), respectively): gains from monitoring all loans are lower, and potential
gains from risk-shifting are higher.
In part (iv) of the proposition, a diversified bank does not monitor all loans, but it is still possible
that a diversified bank monitors only home sector loans even though a specialized bank does not, in which
case the bank prefers to diversify. The intuition and requirements are similar to those of Proposition 5.1(iii).
Finally, if home sector loans have high downside (part (v) of the proposition), no monitoring occurs,
and the bank prefers to specialize. The intuition is identical to that of Proposition 5.1(iv): diversification only
increases the bank’s chance of failure.
In comparison with diversification into a new sector when monitoring incentives are not in doubt
(Proposition 4.1), the range where diversification is attractive is expanded: because diversification can
improve monitoring incentives, there are cases where diversification is attractive even though home sector
loans have low downside, or new sector loans have high downside – neither of which is true when monitoring
incentives are stronger. Still, compared with the case of pure diversification (Proposition 5.1), diversification
into a new sector is less likely to be attractive. Furthermore, diversification can harm monitoring incentives
if the home sector’s loans have low downside.
With regard to comparative statics, a decrease in the effectiveness of monitoring new sector loans
makes diversification less attractive: the bank is more likely to experience an increase in failure probability
from diversification, less likely to monitor new sector loans, and less likely to monitor loans. Increases in
sector correlation also make diversification less attractive: any decrease in failure probability is lessened, and
monitoring incentives are less likely to improve.
6.  Extensions: Bank Capital, Competition, and Unobservable Loan Allocations
Thus far, I have used a number of simplifying assumptions: the bank finances itself entirely with
debt; the bank’s loan terms are exogenously given, ignoring competitive considerations; the bank’s allocation
of loans across sectors is fully observable. In this section, I analyze the effects of relaxing these assumptions.22
A.  Bank Equity Capital
Although banks do use debt for much of their financing, they also have equity capital, which serves
as a buffer to absorb losses and reduce the probability of financial distress. In addition, by reducing possible
shortfalls on payments to debtholders, equity capital reduces the bank’s incentive to engage in risk-shifting
by not monitoring. Nevertheless, despite equity’s virtues, banks and other lending institutions greatly favor
debt (deposits, commercial paper, medium-term notes, etc.) in their financing mix; equity is costly. Sources
of this cost include tax shield advantages of debt (Orgler and Taggart, 1983), agency problems between bank
managers and outside shareholders (Besanko and Kanatas, 1996), and information asymmetries that make
equity especially difficult to issue and costly to hold (Bolton and Freixas, 1996, Gorton and Winton, 1998).
As a result, when financing themselves, banks trade off the costs of debt against the costs of increasing the
amount of equity in their capital structure. 
In my model, any cost of capital guarantees that, all else equal, the bank prefers less capital to more.
Thus, even if the bank can raise enough capital to rule out failure and ensure that its incentive to monitor is
positive, it will prefer diversification strategies that can achieve these ends with less capital. The bank may
even prefer some risk of failure if the amount of capital needed to prevent failure is sufficiently great.
Let k indicate the fraction of bank financing that takes the form of equity capital; then the bank must
issue debt with face value D such that expected payments on debt equal 1>k+b]Pr(failure). The three critical
cases from Definition 2 still occur, but now depend on k: low downside risk corresponds to r(M,B) A 1>k,
moderate downside risk to r(M,B) < 1>k and ½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)] A A>k(1>φBB)
M1, and high downside risk
to r(M,B) < 1>k and ½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)] < A>k(1>φBB)
M1. Conditions for the bank to monitor when
monitoring incentives are weaker (i.e.,(1>qG)L>c < 0) are affected in similar fashion; for example, the
condition from Proposition 2.2(ii) guaranteeing that a specialized bank monitors is now (1>q s)L>c A
(1>p)][1>k>r(U,B)]. Thus, increasing k has effects similar to decreasing the downside risk of loans: it
reduces the bank’s probability of failure and alleviates any underinvestment problem.
The common view is that diversified banks need less capital than specialized banks because, all else
equal, diversified banks have lower failure probabilities and better monitoring incentives. The analysis from
the preceding two sections shows that this is too simple a view. First, consider the case of pure diversification
(no decrease in monitoring ability). Suppose that loans’ downside risk is low, so that either r(M,B) exceeds
1 or else the cost of raising 1>r(M,B) of equity capital is relatively small. In this case, both specialized and
diversified banks can achieve freedom from failure with the same amount of capital; however, if monitoring
incentives are weaker, a specialized bank may require somewhat more capital than a diversified bank to
maintain its monitoring incentives. Thus, if capital is relatively inexpensive and loan risk is sufficiently low,
the capital advantage of diversified banks is relatively small.
Suppose instead capital is more expensive and loans’ downside risk is somewhat higher, so that19 If 1>r(M,B) <  (1>φBB){A>½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)]}, then only the second statement applies.
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1>r(M,B) of equity capital is significantly expensive to raise, but ½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)] still exceeds A. A
diversified bank that does not raise capital fails less often than a specialized bank and may have better
monitoring incentives. In this case, the specialized bank does have a greater need for capital, especially when
monitoring incentives are an issue; the common wisdom is correct.
Finally, if loans’ downside risk is higher still, a diversified bank without capital fails more often than
a specialized bank. In this case, the diversified bank gains more from additional capital than does the
specialized bank; (1>φBB){A>½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)]} of equity capital reduces the diversified bank’s chance
of failure by 2φBG, but does not help the specialized bank; 1>r(M,B) of equity capital reduces the diversified
bank’s failure probability by 1>φGG and only reduces the specialized bank’s failure probability by 1>p.
19
The bottom line is that, even with pure diversification, the marginal value of capital depends on the
relative downside risk of loans. The same reasoning can be applied to the case where banks start with a
certain amount of capital k0 and then face an increase in loan risk; while diversified banks may have less need
to raise additional capital than specialized banks, matters can go the other way. I will return to this issue in
Section 7 when I discuss applications of the model.
Now consider the case where diversification forces the bank to move into a sector where its
monitoring is less effective. From Sections 4 and 5, in the absence of equity capital, such diversification is
more likely to have harmful effects, and these harmful effects are most likely to win out when the downside
risk of home sector loans is either low or high. It follows that it is more likely that a diversified bank benefits
more from additional capital than a specialized bank, particularly if the downside risk of home sector loans
is either low or high. Low monitoring effectiveness in the new sector, stronger monitoring incentives in the
home sector, and high sector correlation all have similar effect. Conversely, a diversified bank is most likely
to require less capital if the downside risk of home sector loans is moderate, sector correlation is low, and
monitoring incentives for home sector loans are weaker. Similar results apply if the bank begins with a
certain amount of capital k0.
B. Competitive  Considerations
Although I have taken the bank’s lending terms as exogenous, these terms are clearly influenced by
the bank’s competitive environment. To discuss this, consider the following simple model of borrower-lender
interaction. Suppose that borrowers have projects whose returns per dollar borrowed are either X with
probability qs, or zero with probability 1>qs, where again s refers to the state of the borrower’s sector. In
addition, the project itself is an asset that can be liquidated at some interim date for an amount K < 1, but
depreciates to zero value at the end of the period. The borrower has some nontransferable benefit of control
that is lost if the project is liquidated, so that, ex post, the borrower will not liquidate unless forced to do so.20 A decrease in L lowers monitoring incentives, which may make diversification more attractive.
This assumes collateral loses much of its value if the bank does not monitor and seize it in timely fashion.
Otherwise, too much collateral can actually undermine monitoring incentives; see Rajan and Winton (1995).
21Conversely, if faced with increased competition from diversified banks, a bank may gain by
focusing on a single sector and building specialized lending expertise that outstrips that of less-focused
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A bank loan contract with face value R O X and collateral requirement L O K gives the bank the right
to collect R or liquidate and collect L otherwise. Given the borrower’s preference for continuation, the bank
must force liquidation before the end of the period, when the collateral is worthless. This in turn requires that
the bank must monitor so that it gets notice of the borrower’s situation before the end of the period.
If the bank faces no competition at all, it can increase R up to X and demand full collateral K, giving
it expected revenue of q sX+(1>q s)K>c if it monitors and q sX otherwise. Conversely, if competition is fierce
and all banks are expected to monitor, then R and L are chosen such that q sR+(1>q s)L>c = 1 + (expected
failure costs and costs of capital).
What does competition do to the bank’s incentive to diversify? To the extent that R and L fall, the
analysis of Corollary 3.2 applies. If loans begin with low downside, lower R and L make it more likely that
loan downside becomes moderate and diversification becomes more attractive. If loans begin with moderate
downside, it is more likely that loan downside becomes high and diversification becomes unattractive.
20
This discussion assumes that all banks are identical. If banks differ in their monitoring ability, there
are two complicating effects. First, to the extent borrowers want ex ante to commit to efficient liquidation
(even though ex post they would like to renege), they will prefer banks that are more effective monitors.
Thus, to get business, a bank that is relatively ineffective must offer borrowers lower expected payments.
Second, if borrowers vary, a bank that is a relatively ineffective may get a worse mix of borrowers through
adverse selection. For example, in the screening version of the model, more risky borrowers are more likely
to come to a less effective bank because they are less likely to be discovered. In the monitoring version,
borrowers with greater preference for continuation will prefer the less effective bank; such borrowers may
prefer a higher rate R in return for lower collateral requirements L, worsening the spread between the bank’s
returns in good and bad states. Both effects increase the downside of the bank’s loans, increasing its
probability of failure and possibly worsening its monitoring incentives.
One immediate consequence is that expansion into an unfamiliar sector is even less attractive if that
sector is already served by experienced incumbent banks. As noted in the introduction, several recent papers
have investigated how the entry barrier raised by local knowledge and relationships affects lending market
structure when banks screen potential borrowers. In the context of the current paper, the local banks’
information advantage worsens the quality of the expanding bank’s new sector loans; by Proposition 4.1, this
in turn increases the expanding bank’s risk of failure and diminishes its monitoring incentives.
21rivals. See Boot and Thakor (1998).
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On the other hand, if a bank is able to acquire expertise in a new sector at relatively low cost –
perhaps through acquisition – this might increase its monitoring incentives and reduce its risk of failure,
giving it advantages over less diversified rivals. This is most likely if loans have moderate downside, so that
diversification’s effect is likely to be positive and specialized rivals are faced with weak monitoring
incentives or relatively high levels of costly capital. If loan downside is too high, diversification is less likely
to improve monitoring incentives or reduce the bank’s risk of failure, and any additional reduction in
performance from the possible diseconomies of scale mentioned in Section 2 only worsens matters.
Finally, my paper focuses on a single-period setting. Clearly, a bank can acquire expertise in new
sectors over time, albeit at the cost of making mistakes along the way. Nevertheless, if the short-run impact
of diversification is likely to be negative, then even if it believes that long-run benefits outweigh short-run
costs, a bank moving into new sectors should temporarily boost capital to cope with increased risk.
C.  Unobservable Loan Allocations
Although I have assumed that investors can freely observe the bank’s loan allocation when pricing
the bank’s debt accordingly, this is clearly a simplification. The portfolios of smaller institutions or banks
in emerging markets may be especially difficult to observe. On the other hand, such institutions tend to make
loans in their own back yard, so the general types of borrowers may be known even if precise details are not;
this again suggests that loan quality (monitoring) is less observable than general sector allocations.
To the extent that sector allocations are known only imprecisely at any given time, it is well-known
that banks may have incentive to engage in risk-shifting by concentrating their loan portfolios and that they
may be less likely to do this if future rents (“charter value”) are jeopardized by bank failure (see Marcus,
1984, and Besanko and Thakor, 1993). Nevertheless, my model suggests additional complications, both
because diversification may affect monitoring incentives and thus bank performance, and because I
emphasize that diversification does not always increase the probability of costly bank failure.
Suppose the bank is considering pure diversification. If the bank’s loan allocation is completely
unobservable and no future rents are at stake, it never diversifies: if investors thought it would diversify, it
could always specialize, inducing a mean-preserving spread in its loan portfolio returns and creating risk-
shifting gains. By extension, if loan allocations are partially observable, a decrease in observability makes
specialization relatively more attractive. This effect is less pronounced if bank monitoring incentives are
weaker, since diversification (to the extent it is observable) increases monitoring incentives, lowering the
face value of the bank’s debt and reducing risk-shifting incentives. If future rents are at stake, and loans have
moderate downside, higher future rents make diversification more attractive; however, if loans have high
downside, a specialized strategy reduces the bank’s probability of failure, and higher future rents make22 Again, this is not to say that regional banks whose regions were hit by downturns had no problems;
consider the failures of most major commercial banks in Texas in the 1980s and of Bank of New England
in 1991. The point is that regional banks were only exposed to downturns in their respective regions, whereas
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specialization more attractive.
When diversification involves moving into sectors where the bank lacks expertise, matters are more
complicated: now, moving into a new sector may itself be a form of risk-shifting, particularly if the downside
of monitored home sector loans is low and monitoring effectiveness in the new sector is poor. In this case,
a bank that is expected to specialize and exploit its monitoring expertise may instead be tempted to diversify
and spend relatively little effort monitoring its loans.
More generally, although earlier research has often focused on under-diversification as a means of
risk-shifting in banking, risk-shifting involves actions that are difficult for investors (and regulators) to
observe and control in a timely fashion. Major loan portfolio concentrations are likely to be more easily
observed in timely fashion than is the effort put into screening and monitoring loans. Thus, risk-shifting in
lending is harder to control if it takes the form of making bad loans or letting deteriorating loans continue,
and this type of risk-shifting can be associated with diversification as well as with lack of diversification.
7. Applications
I have argued that, in contrast to the common view, diversification is not always the best strategy for
banks and other lending intermediaries: while diversification may reduce failure probability and increase
monitoring incentives, there are circumstances where one or both of these results are reversed. In this section,
I apply these results to a number of real examples of intermediary behavior.
Diversification, failure probability, and equity capital: money center banks in the 1980s. During the
1970s and early 1980s, U.S. money center banks were generally more diversified than U.S. regional banks,
lending to a wide variety of firms and institutions both nationally and internationally whereas the regionals
tended to focus more on the geographic regions in which they were headquartered. Consistent with common
wisdom, money center banks operated with lower capital levels during this period. In the late 1970s and early
1980s loan risk increased as  price levels became more volatile and competition among banks eroded their
margins. Although banks specializing in the energy sector were hit particularly hard, throughout most of the
1980s money center banks performed worse on average than did regional banks (see Boyd and Graham,
1991), facing continued weakness in LDC loans which in turn led to increased financial difficulties.
Even if both money center and regional banks were adequately capitalized in the mid 1970s, an
increase in loans’ downside risk later in the decade may have resulted in a situation where a downturn in
even one sector (such as LDC loans) was sufficient to cause difficulties for a diversified bank – the situation
of Proposition 3.1(iii).
22 If so, the money centers would have had the most to gain from additional capital;diversified banks faced dangerous shocks from multiple sectors.
23 The bank typically holds an equity claim (the so-called “residual”) on the SPV and may inject
some actual equity capital to reduce debtholders’ risk of losses.
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but of course, given the combination of flat-rate deposit insurance and limited capital adequacy guidelines
in force at the time, the banks did not voluntarily increase capital. The result was that a number of money-
center banks were hobbled by the LDC crisis for much of the 1980s. Indeed, it is likely that some (such as
Bank of America or Citicorp) would have failed if the government’s safety net (deposit insurance and the
“too-big-to-fail” policy of the 1980s) had not been in place.
Impact of reduced monitoring costs on diversification incentives: securitization. Improved
monitoring incentives are one potential gain from diversification, but all else equal, lower monitoring costs
decrease the extent of the underinvestment problem. Thus, if technological improvements have lowered costs
of screening and monitoring borrowers, gains from diversification are less than before. This may help
account for the growth of securitization, where a bank or other lending institution spins off related loans into
a separate “special purpose vehicle” (SPV) which issues debt backed by the loans.
23 By doing this, the bank
gives up the financing benefit of diversification across multiple sectors: debt issued by the SPV does not have
a claim on the bank’s total loan portfolio.
My model suggests that an undiversified strategy is most attractive for loans with either limited risk
(low downside) or severe cyclicality (high downside), and for loans where monitoring costs are relatively
low. This is consistent with some of the most active areas of securitization. Loans to individuals can be dealt
with through credit scoring (which requires large homogeneous samples), whereas loans to businesses require
more costly individual analysis; not surprisingly, loans to individuals have been securitized in far greater
volumes than have loans to businesses. Also, the business loans that have been securitized tend to be high-
grade credits that have low default risk even in recessions. Of course, my model is not the only explanation
for the growth of securitization, which has undoubtedly been influenced by reduced information costs for
investors and by bank regulatory capital requirements that unfairly penalize some classes of loans.
Failure to diversify and underinvestment in monitoring: Continental Illinois. Proposition 2.2
suggests that an undiversified bank does not monitor its loans when two conditions are met: first, monitoring
does not pay in good sector states, so that (1>qG)L is less than the cost of monitoring c; second, risk-shifting
gains are high, so that r(M,B) < 1>[p/(1>p)][(1>qG)L>c], which is more likely as p increases. Thus, my
model predicts that monitoring is most problematic for undiversified institutions whose loans are believed
to be quite safe in good times (qG high) and for which bad times are believed to be remote (p high).
Continental Illinois may be a case in point.
As noted in the introduction, Continental Illinois is often viewed as an example of how lack of24 Indeed, despite its rapid loan growth and low capital levels, Continental maintained investor
confidence until 1982 because investors believed that the bank’s specialization in energy made it better at
picking out good energy loans from bad – a confidence that was admittedly misplaced. See Herring (199_).
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diversification leads to excessive exposure; however, on closer examination, the problem seems to have been
poor monitoring as much as exposure to sectoral shocks. As shown by Herring (199?), a fifth of Continental’s
loans were concentrated in the energy sector, which certainly hurt when oil prices plummeted in the early
1980s. Nevertheless, it was the billion dollars of energy loans purchased from Penn Square Bank that
produced the largest losses: roughly 50% during 1982-1984, as opposed to 6% for the other energy loans
during the same period. As is well-known, these loans were overseen by an officer later found to be taking
large subsidized personal loans from Penn Square. More generally, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency found evidence of lax credit standards in Continental’s commercial loan operation over a period
of several years. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Continental’s loan growth rate was significantly higher
and its capital/assets ratio significantly lower than that of the average money center bank; both would suggest
a process of risk-shifting that was as much due to poor credit controls as to loan concentration per se.
24 
Continental’s lax standards were undoubtedly fueled by the belief (widespread in the late 1970s) that
energy prices were extremely likely to stay high, making default remote; in terms of the model, p was high.
Furthermore, as long as energy prices stayed high, energy-producing firms were thought to have little risk;
1>qG was low. These are precisely the circumstances in which my model predicts that monitoring incentives
are most harmed by lack of diversification.
Specialization and improved performance. My model suggests that specialization can result in
superior performance when underinvestment in monitoring is not a problem – i.e., when (1>qG)L  exceeds
c – and when lack of experience in a sector results in significantly worse performance (γ is low). Recent
experiences in credit card lending illustrate this situation.
For credit cards, the screening interpretation of the model is most relevant, since recoveries on
defaulting accounts are problematic at best; indeed, the industry focuses largely on computerized scoring
models, as already noted, so that c is relatively low. Even in good times, credit card defaults are significantly
higher than those on other consumer loans; in terms of the model, 1>qG is relatively high for credit card
loans. Thus, for skilled institutions, underinvestment need not be a problem.
In the 1990s, increased competition for credit card accounts led to a number of changes. Consumers
became more sophisticated in “card-hopping” to take advantage of ever-more prevalent “teaser” rates
(introductory low-rate offers good for a limited time), annual fees were much reduced, and more customers
were already heavily-indebted, increasing both the chance and magnitude of potential defaults. Thus, average
rates and fees decreased, decreasing lending returns, and the penalty for not using sophisticated, rapidly-
updated scoring models increased. In terms of the model, r(U,B) and r(M,B) fell, as did γ. The model predicts25 The only “monoline” (specialized) credit-card issuer that experienced difficulty was Advanta, the
smallest of the group, whose chargeoffs peaked at an annualized rate of 6.6% of receivables in the first
quarter of 1997. Business press articles suggest that Advanta had suffered from outdated credit scoring
models that did not capture increased “winner’s curse” problems in the credit card market caused by
increased competition. See Advanta’s Annual Reports for 1994-1996, Advanta’s Quarterly Releases for 1996
and 1997, and Hansell (1995, 1997a).
26 See “Low-Doc Loans Low in Popularity” (United States Banker, January 1991), Hansell (1994),
and Citicorp’s Annual Reports, 1989-1996.
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that these changes should favor specialized institutions, whereas diversified institutions relying on “standard”
scoring models should be more likely to suffer from poor performance and reduced monitoring incentives.
This is precisely what happened in the mid 1990s. After a rapid increase in lending volumes, defaults
rose rapidly in 1996-1997. Nevertheless, the institutions that were hit hardest tended to be the ones for which
credit cards had been a profitable sideline. By contrast, despite having grown more rapidly than the industry
average, the specialized credit card issuers First USA, CapitalOne, and MBNA continued to have above-
average credit performance due to superior credit scoring techniques (Hansell, 1997a,b).
25 Similarly,
Citicorp, the largest issuer, also had above-average credit-card loan performance in 1996-1997, in marked
contrast with its experience in the early 1990s when it followed a more-diversified strategy (see below).
Diversification into new areas and poor performance: Citicorp and the S&L industry. As mentioned
in the introduction, during the 1980s and early 1990s, many well-known institutions diversified into new
areas with disastrous results. Citicorp is a prime example. During the 1980s, it viewed its diversification as
a strategic asset, arguing that this should greatly substitute for equity capital, yet the result of its rapid
expansion was severe losses not only in its LDC loans but also in its U.S. commercial and residential real
estate loans, credit card loans, and loans for “highly leveraged transactions” (leveraged buyouts). Subsequent
accounts suggest that both lack of internal controls and lack of understanding of new market conditions go
a long way toward explaining these losses. By late 1990, the situation was quite severe, but Citicorp survived,
no doubt in part because of the government safety net already mentioned.
Once the U.S. recession of the early 1990s ended, Citicorp refocused its efforts on a few key areas:
credit cards, loans to high net worth individuals, and loans to multinational corporations. Indeed, its skills
in credit cards led to below average losses in 1996, when most U.S. issuers were experiencing high losses.
In addition, by emphasizing credit card loans to high net worth individuals in emerging economies and
exploiting superior credit scoring skills and systems technology, Citicorp was able to overcome the usual
problems caused by entering new markets in the face of established lenders; few domestic banks could match
Citicorp’s expertise in evaluating and servicing large numbers of credit card customers. One could even argue
that the emerging economies were a more favorable environment for Citicorp’s credit card loans than the
U.S., where it faced relatively stiff competition.
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The S&L crisis of the 1980s provides another example of the risks of diversifying into new areas.
As is well-known, the S&Ls’ low net worth positions led them to take advantage of Federal deposit insurance
by engaging in risky lending. Their risky loans were in large part a diversification from their traditional base
of home mortgage loans into loans backed by commercial real estate – an area in which they lacked expertise
(see Brewer and Mondschean, 1992). Indeed, the S&Ls’ newfound ability to make such loans was made
possible by a Congress anxious to let them diversify the credit and interest rate risks they faced from their
traditional mortgage lending; however, any reduction in risk from the move into a somewhat different sector
was more than offset by poor monitoring.
8.  Policy Implications and Conclusions
Do my results suggest a role for regulators? Even if banks maximize shareholder value, which in turn
incorporates expected benefits from monitoring and expected costs of bank failure, bank incentives to
monitor and to diversify are affected by competitive conditions, which regulators can influence. Also, social
costs of bank failure may be higher than those borne by investors alone, and social costs of bank capital are
likely to be less than the private cost to bank shareholders (see Gorton and Winton, 1998), so in a richer
model even value-maximizing banks may not choose socially optimal outcomes. Finally, bank managers may
prefer diversification for its own sake as a form of empire-building.
Given these potential imperfections, my paper suggests that regulators must be careful in endorsing
diversification across multiple sectors or regions as a goal for banks and related intermediaries. Although
such diversification may reduce the odds of bank failure and improve bank performance by enhancing
monitoring incentives, these beneficial effects of diversification are most likely for loans with moderate
downside risk: when loans have limited downside, diversification adds little; if loans have high downside,
diversification may actually increase the odds of bank failure. Furthermore, if diversification involves
expansion into sectors where the bank is lacking in expertise, then the relatively worse performance the bank
faces in these new sectors can increase its overall chance of failure and weaken monitoring incentives
throughout the institution; again, this is most likely when loans in the bank’s home sector have either low
or high downside. Finally, while increased competition among banks can make diversification more
attractive, it can also have the opposite effect.
In terms of capital regulation, although diversified banks may often need less capital than specialized
banks, a general increase in the downside risk of loans can result in more diversified banks actually needing
additional capital more than do less diversified banks. Similarly, a bank that diversifies into new areas may
need more capital than a bank that focuses on sectors in which it already has significant credit expertise.
Finally, a more general point of this paper is that for institutions that act as delegated monitors of
borrowers, credit risk is fundamentally endogenous; it is greatly affected by the bank’s expertise and31
investment in loan screening and monitoring. This suggests that quantitative models such as CreditMetrics
or CreditRisk
+ that take credit risk as exogenous should be used with caution: regulators must bear in mind
that a bank’s internal monitoring and evaluation systems are at least as important as these measures of
portfolio risk. Also, although much of the literature on bank risk-shifting as a response to governmental
safety nets assumes that this behavior takes the form of lack of diversification across sectors, this too may
be somewhat misleading. Diversification is relatively easy to observe, while monitoring ability and effort
are not. Thus, risk-shifting through underinvestment in monitoring may be the greater problem for regulators,
and this can occur either through lack of diversification or through diversification into new sectors.
Looking to the future, this paper suggests two avenues for further research. The first is empirical
work on the impact of diversification and specialization on loan return distributions. Thus far, such work has
either focused on the performance of big banks versus small banks (e.g., Boyd and Graham, 1991, Boyd and
Runkle, 1993, Akhavein et al., 1996), used the bank-specific component of stock returns as an indicator of
risk (e.g., Demsetz and Strahan, 1998),or examined the performance of randomly selected portfolios of actual
loans (e.g., Carey, 1998). As more data on actual institutions’ loans by sector becomes available, studies that
focus on how mean loan returns and tail probabilities relate to actual diversification/specialization choices
should be possible. The second is theoretical modeling of the impact of agency problems within a lending
institution on tradeoffs between diversification and specialization. For some initial work along these lines,
see Cerasi and Daltung (1996) and Boot and Schmeits (1998).32
½(1>φBB)r(M,G) ½(1 φBB)r(M,B) < 1 φBB]b. (A.1)
Appendix A. Proofs of Results in Text
Proof of Lemma 2.1. (i) This follows from the definition of marginal probabilities for a given sector’s state.
(ii) Normalizing each sector i’s return to zi = 0 in state B and 1 in state G doesn’t alter correlation.
The mean and variance of zi are p and p(1-p), while the covariance between sectors is E[z1z2] > E[z1]E[z2]
= φGG > p
2; the formula for correlation follows easily.
(iii) If p is constant, increased sector correlation implies φGG increases. From (i) and p constant, this
implies that φBG decreases; since 1>p is also constant, this in turn implies that φBB increases). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. (i) (1>qG)L > c implies r(M,G) > r(U,G) and r(M,B) > r(U,B), so for any debt face
value D, π(1,M,],D) > π(1,U,],D), and monitoring (σ(1) = M) is the only equilibrium choice. Equilibrium debt
face values and associated failure probabilities follow from investors’ breakeven constraint.
(ii) If r(M,B) < 1, the bank always fails in the bad state; since r(M,G) < r(U,G), the bank won’t
monitor. If r(M,B) A 1, π(1,M,],1) A π(1,U,],1)guarantees D = 1 is consistent with equilibrium monitoring.
This is equivalent to q dR+(1>q d)L>c>1 A p(qGR>1); using the definition of q d and rearranging yields the
conditions in the text. (This is the weakest such condition, since D A 1.) Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. That the bank will always monitor follows the same proof as Proposition 2.2(i).
(i) Under the convention that investors pick the lowest debt face value that is consistent with
equilibrium monitoring, this result is obvious.
(ii) Since r(M,B) < 1, Proposition 2.2(i) implies D
s = D
M; also, the diversified bank must fail when
both sectors are in bad states (state BB). A is the breakeven face value of debt that investors demand if the
bank only defaults in state BB; ½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)]is the bank’s loan portfolio return in states BG and GB.
If this return weakly exceeds A, then D
d = A is consistent with equilibrium and the bank fails in state BB
only. Since A equals D
M with p replaced by 1>φBB A p, and D
M is decreasing in p, D
d < D
s. Diversification
does not affect monitoring and reduces failure probability, so it increases the bank’s expected profits.
(iii) Since ½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)] < A, a diversified bank must fail in states BG and GB as well as BB,
so its probability of failure is at least 1>φGG = 1>p+φBG.. (Investors will demand an even higher debt face
value, of course.) By contrast, a specialized bank fails with probability 1>p. Since diversification does not
affect monitoring and increases failure probability, the bank prefers not to diversify. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 3.2. (i) Starting from moderate downside, changes that make high downside more likely
are those that make ½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)] < A more likely. Multiplying through by 1>φBB and rearranging, this
is equivalent to
The effect of increases in r(M,s) on (A.1) is obvious, proving (a). Also, ½(1>φBB) < p and ½(1+φBB) > 1>p,
so the LHS of this expression puts more weight on r(M,B) and less on r(M,G) than the bank’s mean sector
return; if r(M,G) increases and r(M,B) decreases without changing mean return, the LHS decreases and the
RHS is unchanged. The described changes in qG and qB have this effect, proving (b). Returning to
½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)] < A, the LHS is independent of correlation and b, while A is increasing in correlation
(A increases in φBB, and φBB increases in correlation by Lemma 2.1) and in b; this proves (c) and (d). Finally,
an increase in correlation makes φBB bigger, so (1>p)>φBB decreases. 
(ii) This follows directly from the effects of these changes on the condition r(M,B) < 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. The proof that the bank always monitors loans in either sector follows the same
lines as the proof that the bank always monitors in Proposition 2.2(i).33
π(U,U)  ¯ qR> 1  φBB 1>r(U,B)  2φBG]max S1>½ r(U,B)r(U,G) ,0[,a n d
π(M,U)  ¯ qR ½ (1>¯ q)L>c > 1  φBB]max S1>½ r(U,B)r(M,B) ,0[ 
φBG]max S1>½ r(U,B)r(M,G) ,0[ .
(A.2)
π(M,M) > π(U,U)  X > 2φBG]max SA>½ r(U,B) r(U,G) ,0[ O X, and
π(M,M) > π(M,U)  ½X > φBG]max SA>½ r(U,B) r(M,G) ,0[ O ½X.
(A.3)
(i) If ½[r(M,B)+r(N,B)] A 1, a diversified bank never fails; in this case, its expected profit is
q dR+½(1>q d)(1+γ)L>c>1 < q dR+(1>q d)L>c>1, which is the expected profit of a specialized bank. If
½[r(M,B)+r(N,B)] < 1, the diversified bank’s profit is even lower due to expected failure costs.
(ii) If both home and new sector loans have moderate downside, a specialized bank fails when the
home sector is in its bad state (probability 1>p) while a diversified bank only fails in state BB (probability
φBB). A specialized bank’s expected profits are q dR+(1>q d)L>c>[1+(1>p)b], while a diversified bank’s are
q dR+½(1>q d)(1+γ)L>c>[1+φBB]b]. Recalling that φBB+φBG = 1>p, thisleads to the condition in the text.
(iii) If new sector loans have high downside, a diversified bank fails in states BB and GB. Thus, its
expected financing cost is at least 1+(1>p)b, which is the financing cost for a specialized bank; since it has
lower expected loan returns, the diversified bank is less profitable. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. To simplify notation, I will write π(½,σ1 ,σ2 ,D) as π(σ1 ,σ2). If the bank is to
monitor both sectors, two conditions are required: π(M,M) A π(M,U) and π(M,M) A π(U,U). Also, note that
max {½ [r(σ1 ,s1)+r(σ2 ,s2)]>D, 0} = ½ [r(σ1 ,s1)+r(σ2 ,s2)]>D  + max {D>½ [r(σ1 ,s1)+r(σ2 ,s2)], 0}, so
expected bank profits equal expected loan returns less D plus any expected shortfalls on repaying D.
(i) If r(M,B) A1, then if the bank is expected to monitor, D(1) = 1 and the bank does not fail, so
π(M,M) = q dR+(1>q d)L>c>1. We know that r(U,B) < 1 O r(M,B) < r(M,G) < r(U,G), so the bank never
defaults when both sectors are in good states, and ½[r(M,B)+r(U,G)] > 1. Thus
π(M,M) A π(U,U) iff (1>q d)L>c A φBB[1>r(U,B)] + 2φBG ]max {1>½[r(U,B)+r(U,G)], 0}; since φBB+φBG =
1>p, the RHS = (1>p)][1>r(U,B)] > φBG ]min {1>r(U,B), r(U,G)>1}. π(M,M) A π(M,U) is equivalent to
(1>q d)L>c A (1>p)[1>r(U,B)] > φBB ] min {r(M,B)>1, 1>r(U,B)} > φBG ] min {r(M,G)>1, 1>r(U,B)}. In both
cases, the RHS equals (1>p)][1>qBR] less a nonnegative term that increases with φBG, and φBG is decreasing
in sector correlation. The other results in (i) follow from Proposition 2.2(ii).
(ii) In this case, regardless of its monitoring choices, the bank always fails in state BB. If the bank
is expected to monitor both sectors, its rate D
d equals A (Proposition 3.1(ii)), so regardless of its actual
monitoring choice, it won’t fail in state GG (r(U,G) > r(M,G) > A). If it does in fact monitor both sectors,
it won’t fail in state BG or GB; if it only monitors Sector 1, it won’t fail in state BG; other states are
ambiguous. Let X = p[(1>qG)L>c]+φBG[(1>qB)L>c]. A little algebra shows that
Since r(M,G) < r(U,G), it is immediate that π(M,M) A π(M,U) implies π(M,M) A π(U,U). It follows that a
diversified bank monitors both sectors if and only if X A 2φBG ]max {A>½[r(U,B)+r(M,G)], 0}. 
When the condition holds, the bank prefers to diversify because a diversified bank will monitor and
only default in BB (probability 1>φBB), where a specialized bank would not monitor and would fail with
probability 1>p > 1>φBB.34
π(M,U) > π(U,U)  ½X > 2φBG]max SA >½ r(U,B) r(U,G) ,0[











r(U,B) A 1  (1p)b. (A.5)
To see that the condition is less likely to hold as correlation increases, note that higher correlation
means lower φBG and higher φBB. Since X is increasing in φBG, this gives the desired result when the RHS of
the condition is zero. If A > ½[r(U,B)+r(M,G)], moderate downside risk means A O ½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)], so
A>½[r(U,B)+r(M,G)] O ½[r(M,B)>r(M,G)] = ½[(1>qB)L>c]; also, A is increasing in φBB. It follows that X>2
φBG·{A>½[r(U,B)+r(M,G)]} is increasing in φBG and decreasing in φBB, so the desired result follows.
Finally, if X < 0, the condition clearly fails and the bank won’t monitor all loans. Since
^ p[(1>qG)L>c]+(1>
^ p)[(1>qB)L>c] = 0, X < 0 iff p/(p+φBG) > 
^ p.
(iii) I have already shown that the conditions in (i) and (ii) are necessary for the bank to monitor all
loans. Next, I claim that, when M,U is the dominant strategy, the bank fails in states BB and GB but not
states BG or GG (loan return in GB is ½[r(M,G)+r(U,B)] < ½[r(M,B)+r(U,G)] = loan return in BG).
Suppose r(M,B) A 1. If the bank never fails with strategy M,U, π(M,U)>π(M,M) = >½[(1>q d)L>c]
< 0, so M,U is dominated by M,M. If the bank fails only in state BB under strategy M,U, then let Dz > 1 be
the debt face value consistent with this strategy. π(M,U) > π(M,M) iff ½[(1>q d)L>c] <
φBB ]{Dz>½[r(U,B)+r(M,B)]} > φBB ]max {Dz>r(M,B),  0}, while π(M,U) A π(U,U) iff ½[(1>q d)L>c] A
φBB[Dz>r(U,B)] > φBB ]{Dz>½[r(U,B)+r(M,B)]}. Combining the two conditions yields a contradiction.
If r(M,B) < 1 and ½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)] A A, then the bank always fails in state BB regardless of its
monitoring choice. If under strategy M,U the bank fails only in state BB, then π(M,U)>π(M,M) = >½X,
while π(M,U)>π(U,U) = ½X; thus, either M,M weakly dominates M,U, or U,U strictly dominates, yielding
a contradiction. (Note that since r(U,G)+r(U,B) > r(M,G)+r(U,B), the bank fails only in state BB even if it
doesn’t monitor any loans.)
If the bank fails in all states but GG, it is easy to show that π(U,U) > π(M,U). This proves the claim.
Thus, if M,U dominates, a diversified bank fails with probability φBB+φBG = 1>p. A specialized bank
has the same failure probability; since a diversified bank monitors some loans while a specialized bank does
not, the bank prefers to diversify.
The debt face value Dz equals A
* [ p
>1{1+(1>p)b>½φBB[r(M,B)+r(U,B)]>½φBG[r(M,G)+r(U,B)]}
> A. To get the condition ruling out any monitoring, note that ½[r(M,B)+r(U,G)] A A
*, and so
The last two terms on the RHS equal φBG]min{½[r(U,B)+r(U,G)]>A
*, 0} + ½φBG][r(U,G)>r(M,G)], which
is less than ½ φBG ][r(U,G)>r(M,G)] = >½ φBG[(1>qG)L>c]. Thus, π(M,U) < π(U,U) if X > φBG[(1>qG)L>c]
= φGG[(1>qG)L>c]+φBG[(1>qB)L>c] [ Y < 0. Y < 0 is equivalent to φGG/(φGG+φBG) = φGG/p > 
^ p. Also, since
p/(p+φBG) = (φGG+φBG)/(p+φBG) > φGG/p, φGG/p > 
^ p implies p/(p+φBG) > 
^ p; thus by (ii), π(M,M) < π(U,U) when
Y < 0. Finally, an increase in correlation increases φGG but leaves p and 
^ p unchanged.
(iv) If it monitors both sectors, the bank fails in all states but GG. The same is true if it does not
monitor any loans: ½[r(U,G)+r(U,B)] = ½[r(M,G)+r(M,B)] > ½(1>qG+1>qB)L>c < ½[r(M,G)+r(M,B)], since
qG < qB and p A ½ imply ½(1>qG+1>qB) A 1>q d, and (1>q d)L>c > 0. Thus, π(M,M)>π(U,U) = φGG[(1>qG)L>c]
< 0. If the bank monitors only Sector 1, it fails in states BB and GB; however, for M,U to be chosen, the
argument from (iii) above shows that the bank must survive in state BG, so ½[r(M,B)+r(U,G)] A A
*, where
A
* is defined in (iii). Rearranging yields35
π(M,N) > π(M,U)  ½X > φBG]max SA >½ r(U,B) r(M,G) ,0[ , (A.6)
Since ½[r(M,B)+r(M,G)] < A, (A.1) holds. Subtracting (A.1) from (A.5) yields >[(1>q d)L>c] > φBG ]b A 0,
which is a contradiction. Thus M,U cannot be an equilibrium choice, and the bank won’t monitor any loans.
Since a diversified bank won’t monitor and will fail with probability 1>φBG , it is better off
specializing, where it won’t monitor and will only fail with probability. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. (i) By Proposition 2.2(ii), a specialized bank monitors and never fails. Since at best
a diversified bank monitors all loans and does not fail, specializing is better, as per Proposition 4.1(i).
(ii) Here, a specialized bank won’t monitor, so its expected loan returns are q dR and its expected
financing costs are 1+(1>p)b. If M,N is a diversified bank’s choice, then it never fails, its expected loan
returns are  q dR+½(1>q d)(1+γ)L>c, and its financing costs are 1, so diversification will be preferred.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for M,N to be the monitoring choice are π(M,N) A π(M,U)
and π(U,U). Both π(M,U) and π(U,U) are given by (A.2); similar manipulations as per the proof of
Proposition 5.1(i) lead to (1>q d)γL>c A (1>p)][1>r(U,B)]>hz. (When π(M,N) A π(M,U) is binding, hz = h
from Proposition 5.1(i); when π(M,N) A π(U,U) is binding, hz = h + ½(1>q d)(1>γ)L.) It is straightforward to
show that the condition is more binding as correlation increases or effectiveness γ decreases.
(iii) By assumption, a specialized bank won’t monitor, so it earns q dR less 1+(1>p)b. If a diversified
bank chooses M,N when Sector 2 loans have moderate downside, it fails only in state BB, so its loan returns
are as in (ii) and its financing costs are 1+φBB·b; thus, diversification is preferred.
The derivation of the necessary and sufficient condition for M,N to be chosen follows the same lines
as that of the condition in Proposition 5.1(ii). The debt face value is Az, and the bank fails only in BB;
analogy to (A.3) shows that 
where Xz = p[(1>qG)γL>c]+φBG[(1>qB)γL>c]. Simple rearrangement yields the condition in the text. π(M,N)
A π(U,U) can be rearranged to give a similar condition; using ½(1+γ) > γ and r(U,G) > r(M,G), it is easy to
show that this second condition is less binding than π(M,N) A π(M,U). It is straightforward to show that
π(M,N) A π(M,U) becomes more binding as correlation increases or effectiveness γ decreases.
The sufficient condition for ruling out monitoring both sectors follows by noting that, when
p/(p+φBG) A ˜ p, ½p[(1>qG)γL>c] + ½φBG[(1>qB)γL>c] O 0.
(iv) Since (i) is violated, a specialized bank won’t monitor and fails with probability (1>p). Since
(ii) and (iii) give the necessary conditions for a diversified bank to monitor both sectors, their violation (a)
rules out strategy M,N, and a diversified bank chooses either M,U or U,U; (b) leads to the same result, since
if the bank did choose M,N, it would fail in states BB and GB, in which case monitoring Sector 2 would be
unattractive. From here on, the proof for mirrors that of Proposition 5.1(iii).
(v) The proof is identical to that of Proposition 5.1(iv). Q.E.D.36
β 
1  pD  (1p)(qBRb)
(1p)(DqBRb)
,
Appendix B. Alternative Equilibria
Proposition B.1. Alternative equilibria for specialized bank.
(i) If (1>qG)L O c, q dR A 1 + (1>p)b, and r(M,B) O D
U [ p
-1{ 1 >(1>p)][r(U,B)>b)]}, then there is an
equilibrium in which the bank does not monitor (σ(1) = U), the face value of its debt D(1) is D
U > D
M > 1,
and the bank fails with probability 1>p. If any of these conditions are not met, there is no equilibrium in
which the bank can raise funds and not monitor its loans. The no-monitoring equilibrium coexists with the
monitoring equilibrium from Proposition 2.2(ii) if (1>p)
2[1>qBR+b] A >p
2[(1>qG)L>c].
(ii) If (1>qG)L O c, r(M,B) O D
U, and q dR+(1>q d)L>c>1 > p(qGR>1), then there exists D
*, 1 < D
* < r(M,B),
s.t. the bank is indifferent between monitoring and not monitoring if its debt face value is D
*. Defining β by
then so long as β is between 0 and 1, there is an equilibrium in which the bank monitors with probability β
and investors demand face value D
*. Whenever this equilibrium exists, there is also an equilibrium in which
the bank monitors with certainty and the bank’s debt face value is 1.
Proof. (i) The definition of D
U follows from the investors’ break-even constraint; feasibility then requires
that q dR A 1 + (1>p)b; and Proposition 2.2(i) gives the first condition. If r(M,B) > D
U, then the bank strictly
prefers monitoring even for D = D
U. For this equilibrium to coexist with the monitoring equilibrium of
Proposition 2.2(ii), D
U  A r(M,B) and r(M,B) must meet the bound described in Proposition 2.2(ii).
Substituting in for D
U and rearranging yields the condition given in the proposition.
(ii) If the first condition doesn’t hold, the bank always monitors. D
* is defined by q dR+(1>q d)L>c>D
* =
p(qGR>D
*), which is between 1 and r(M,B) so long as the second and third conditions hold. When the bank
monitors with probability β and does not monitor with probability 1>β, the investors’ breakeven constraint
is β D
* + (1>β)[pD
* + (1>p)(qBR>b) = 1, which gives rise to the expression for β; since investors break even
and the bank is indifferent between monitoring and not monitoring, this is an equilibrium. On the other hand,
if this equilibrium exists, then the bank strictly prefers to monitor when D = 1, and this satisfies all the
conditions in Proposition 2.2(ii) for such an equilibrium to exist. Q.E.D.37
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